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Torts

by Cynthia Trimboli Adams*
and
Charles R. Adams III**

One hundred years ago, on a stultifyingly hot summer morning, Andrew
Borden, a wealthy, eccentric miser, and his second wife, Abby, were brutally hacked to death in their tiny home in Fall River, Massachusetts.'
The peaceful community was shattered by this gruesome event and by
the sensational murder trial of Mr. Borden's younger daughter, Elizabeth
Andrew Borden. Following her unexpected acquittal, the increasingly reclusive Miss Borden lived on in Fall River, enjoying her inherited wealth,
but always a social outcast, taunted by the children chanting just beyond
her garden wall:
Lizzie Borden took an ax, Gave her mother forty whacks. When she saw
what she had done, She gave her father forty-one!"
A century later, burdened with an oppressive number of torts cases and
rigidly enforced page limitations, the writers of this survey must plead
guilty to a similarly cold-blooded hatchet job. Unlike Lizzie Borden, however, we proceeded with no intention to sever anything vital.
* Assistant Solicitor, State Court of Houston County, Georgia. Of Counsel to the firm of
Adams & Adams, Fort Valley, Georgia. Oxford College of Emory University (A.A., 1977);
Emory University (B.A., M.A., 1979); Mercer University (J.D., cum laude, 1983). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Adams & Adams, Fort Valley, Georgia. Adjunct Professor, Mercer University School of Law. University of Georgia; Mercer University (B.A., 1980; J.D.,
cum laude, 1983). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. See generally VICTORIA LINCOLN, A PRIVATE DISGRACE: LIZZIE BORDEN BY DAYLIGHT
(1967).
2. See Jo Ann Tooley, Who Took the Ax and Gave the Whacks?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 3, 1992, at 16.

3. Id. at 16.

375

MERCER LAW REVIEW
I.

A.

[Vol. 44

INTENTIONAL TORTS

Sexual Harassment

Although sexual harassment is a well-recognized' cause of action in
Georgia, most cases have proceeded under an assault or battery theory.'
In Fox v. Ravinia Club, Inc.5 , however, the court categorized the workrelated sexual harassment of plaintiff as intentional infliction of emotional distresse and granted summary judgment against plaintiff's
claim
7
on the basis of the statute of limitations applicable to that tort.
Plaintiff fared no better in her companion federal litigation s under Title VII. Stating the elements of a cause of action for sexual harassment
under federal law, 10 the court concluded that although the "casual atmosphere and loose conversation sometimes had sexual connotations or sexual implications,"" it did not rise to the level of an abusive environment
sufficient to affect the conditions of plaintiff's employment. 2
B.

Trespass

Trespass to Realty. Two "dam" cases during the survey period resulted in defeat of the plaintiffs' claims. The beavers won in Bracey v.
King.'3 The beaver's dams on defendant's land backed water up onto
plaintiff's property. Applying the rule that "'a landowner is not liable for
diversion [or obstruction] of surface water unless he diverts [or obstructs]
the natural flow of water by "artificial means,"' ' 14 the court did not hold
defendant liable for trespass because a beaver dam is not an artificially
4. See CHARLES R. ADAMS III & CYNTHIA T. ADAMS, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 2-3 (1989
& Supp. 1992) [hereinafter GEORGIA TORTS].
5. 202 Ga. App. 260, 414 S.E.2d 243 (1991).
6. Id. at 261-62, 414 S.E.2d at 244-45. Cf. GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 4, at 20 ("It
might be possible ... to predicate a claim [of sexual harassment] on some theory of mental
abuse, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress").
7. 202 Ga. App. at 262, 414 S.E.2d at 245. See generally O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (1982) (twoyear limitations period for personal injuries).
8. See Fox v. Ravinia Club, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
9. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
10. [P]laintiff must prove: (1) she is a member of the protected group, (2) was the
subject of unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the harassment occurred because of
her sex, (4) the harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of her employment and (5) the employer knew, or should have known, of the harassment

and failed to take remedial action.
Fox, 761 F. Supp. at 800-01.
11. Id. at 801.
12. Id.
13. 199 Ga. App. 831, 406 S.E.2d 265 (1991).
14. Id. at 832, 406 S.E.2d at 266 (quoting Kiel v. Johnson, '179 Ga. App. 43, 44, 345
S.E.2d 131, 133 (1986)).
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created obstruction." Nor could plaintiff recover in Davis v: Beard"
when an artificial dam on defendant's land caused a flood.1 7 Declining to
hold that liability for trespass runs with the title, the court found that
defendant's predecessor had built the dam and defendant herself had not
altered it in any way. Hence, defendant was not liable vicariously for the
acts of her predecessor in title."8
Trespass to Chattel. "Wrongful repossession occurs when a repossession is accompanied by a wrongful act, which [means] an act that 'is in
contravention of some legal duty owed to the party from whose possession
the vehicle is being taken.' "" The court affirmed a wrongful repossession
0 Plaintiff
jury verdict for plaintiff in Purser Truck Sales, Inc. v. Patrick."
bought a car from defendant and made a down payment, but when she
drove the car to defendant's business to make her first payment, defendant impounded the car over a disputed repair bill. Defendant later sold
the car, but never returned plaintiffs down payment to her." The court
agreed that this evidence supported the jury's verdict 2
II.

A.

NEGLIGENCE

In General

"It is virtually impossible to think seriously about torts and not think
of negligence; it is virtually impossible to think seriously about negligence
and not think of the jury.' '23 So begins an extraordinary survey period law
review article by one of Georgia's leading torts scholars, Professor Sentell
of the University of Georgia.24 The article collects and analyzes empirical
data on judicial views of the role of the jury in negligence cases." It is
highly recommended to all trial lawyers and to students of trial practice
and of the jury system.
15. Id.
16. 202 Ga. App. 784, 415 S.E.2d 522 (1992).
17. Id. at 784, 415 S.E.2d at 522.
18. Id., 415 S.E.2d at 523.
19. Borden v. Pope Jeep-Eagle, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 176, 179, 407 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1991)
(quoting Hopkins v. First Union Bank, 193 Ga. App. 109, 113, 387 S.E.2d 144, 148 (1989)).
20. 201 Ga. App. 119, 410 S.E.2d 335 (1991).
21. Id. at 120, 410 S.E.2d at 336.
22. Id. at 122, 410 S.E.2d at 338.
23. R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench,
26 GA. L. REv. 85, 86 (1991).
24. For insight into the legend (and a truly unflattering photograph of the man), see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., The Perilsof Palsgraf: At Large and at Georgia, 28 GA. ST. B.J. 82 (1991).
25. See Sentell, supra note 23; see also Charles B. Mikell, Jury Instructionsand Proximate Cause: An Uncertain Trumpet in Georgia, 27 GA. ST. B.J. 60 (1990).
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How and when a negligence case gets to a jury is always the subject of a
plethora of appellate decisions, and the current survey period Was no exception. Although this is largely the domain of the Georgia Court of Appeals 2 the supreme court occasionally ventures in, as it did in Lau's
Corp. v. Haskins.27 Overruling some loose language in several earlier decisions of the middle bench, 28 the supreme court held that the evidence
must "create a triable issue as to each essential element of the case"; otherwise, summary judgment is appropriate and the case never gets to a
jury. 2

Of course, jury resolution of any negligence claim must be premised on
the breach of some legally cognizable duty.30 Not every legal duty, however, automatically gives rise to a tort claim. In Cechman v. Travis,31 for
example, the court held that Georgia's mandatory child abuse reporting
statute3 2 did not create a private cause of action in tort, at least under the
facts of that case.33
One of the thorniest issues in negligence law is when a breach of contract creates a cause of action in tort.34 In Delancy v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co., 35 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals comprehensively discussed this issue in the context of an insurer's tort liability
to its insured for failure to settle a claim within policy limits. The court
canvassed the Georgia law on this issue and drew the following
''assumption":
[W]hen a liability insurer knows or in the exercise of ordinary care
should know that a suit against its insured could be settled within the
policy limits and that its failure to settle will expose the insured to an
unreasonable risk of harm, including emotional distress, the insurer has a
duty to effect a settlement within a reasonable time after settlement is
possible; if the insurer breaches this duty, it is liable for all damages
26. See

GEORGIA ToRTs,

supra note 4, at 6 ("[T]he great bulk of torts decisions in this

State are rendered by the nine judges of the Court of Appeals").
27. 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991).
28. See David A. Foiehand, Jr. & Ken M. Nimmons, Trial Practiceand Procedure, 44
MERCER

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

L. REv. 421 (1992).

261 Ga. at 495, 405 S.E.2d at 478.
See Robertson v. MARTA, 199 Ga. App. 681, 405 S.E.2d 745 (1991).
202 Ga. App. 255, 414 S.E.2d 282 (1991).
See O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5 (1991).
202 Ga. App. at 256, 414 S.E.2d at 284. "There is no allegation or evidence that...

[defendant) had reasonable cause to believe that the child was a victim of child abuse and
that she knowingly and willfully failed to report that suspicion [as required by the statute]."

Id.
34. See generally GEORGIA

TORTS,

35. 947 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1991).

supra note 4, § 3-7.
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proximately caused by its breach, including damages caused by a delay in
settlement.""
Despite this assumption (which, in any event, the court questioned from a
policy standpoint),8' 7 the court affirmed summary judgment against plaintiffs because (said the court) the facts failed to show defendant had
knowledge of settlement possibilities.8 The decision in Delancy remains
noteworthy, however, for its thoughtful analysis of the issues presented,
including when a contractual relationship presents an independent legal
9
duty.'
In Yow v. Hussey, Gay, Bell & DeYoung International, Inc.,' the
Georgia Court of Appeals determined as a matter of first impression that
an architect or engineer's liability for construction site safety rests not on
a common law or statutory duty, but on the degree of contractual responsibility for construction site safety resting on the defendant."' "The logic
behind such a rule is that one should not be held responsible for that over
which one does not exercise any control."42 The court examined the contract terms and affirmed summary judgment for defendants on the
grounds that the contract conferred "a total absence of. . .responsibility
for site supervision and safety. '" '
B.

Premises Liability

In General. The court of appeals applied Georgia's status-based system of determining liability for injury on premises" in Walker v.Daniels,45 which involved the accidental drowning of a student in a swimming
pool at Fort Valley State College. At issue was whether the decedent occupied the premises as an invitee or a licensee.'6 The duty of care varies
with the status of the person injured,'47 so, if the student occupied the
premises as an invitee, defendants would owe him the duty of ordinary
36. Id. at 1552.
37. Id. The dissent would have certified the question to the Georgia Supreme Court to
resolve "policy questions which Georgia's highest court is best equipped to answer." Id. at
1563 (Clark,. S.J., dissenting).
38. See 947 F.2d at 1553.
39. See also Waldrip v. Voyles, 201 Ga. App. 592, 593-94, 411 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1991).
40. 201 Ga. App. 857, 412 S.E.2d 565 (1991).
41. Id. at 858, 412 S.E.2d at 566.
42. Id. at 859, 412 S.E.2d at 567.
43. Id. at 861, 412 S.E.2d at 568.
44! See generally GEORGIA ToRTS, supra note 4, § 4-1.
45. 200 Ga. App. 150, 407 S.E.2d 70 (1991).
.46. Id. at 151, 407 S.E.2d at 71.
47. See generally Charles R. Adams III & Cynthia T. Adams, Torts, 40 MERCER L. REv.
377, 386-89 (1988).
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care. " If, however, he was only a licensee, defendants would owe a lesser
duty."' The court held that even though he was voluntarily attending a
recreational swim, because the decedent drowned during the course of an
unofficially sanctioned school event,50 he was an invitee.01
The relationship between a college or university and one of its students
is one of common interest and mutual advantage. It follows that a student is an invitee and not a mere licensee or social guest ....

[C]ase

law thus recognizes a duty on the part of the college or university to
exercise ordinary and reasonable care for a student's safety ....
[Clollege administrators do not stand in loco parentis to adult college
students."
If the injured party's presence on the premises is for a purpose that is
or could be beneficial to the owner, an invitation is implied.' "'If, however, [an invitee goes] beyond that part to which he is invited, he becomes a mere licensee.' "" In Swanson v. Smith," plaintiff approached
defendant's residence on a business purpose. When no one came to the
door, plaintiff decided to cross defendant's backyard to visit a friend, and
injured herself when she stepped into a hole in the backyard.," The court
applied the rule stated above to conclude that plaintiff's status had
changed and defendant owed her only the duty to avoid willfully and
wantonly injuring her.57
Was plaintiff in Swanson a licensee or a trespasser when she entered
the backyard?
A trespasser is a person who enters the premises of another wrongfully
and without express or implied permission of the owner, for the trespasser's own benefit or amusement.[19] This may be true even though the
48. See O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (1982). The invitation may be implied by the circumstances or
by the parties' conduct. See Wade v. Polytech Indus., Inc., 202 Ga. App. 18, 24, 413 SE.2d
468, 474 (1991).
49. See O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2 (1982).
50. Although the college had cancelled the swimming event in question, the Director of
Campus Safety testified that "there was a divergence between official policy and practice,"
which resulted in the building being unlocked for the event anyway. 200 Ga. App. at 151-52,
407 S.E.2d at 72.
51. Id. at 155, 407 S.E.2d at 74.
52. Id. at 154-55, 407 S.E.2d at 74 (citations omitted).
53. Wallace v. Pointe Properties, Inc., 202 Ga. App. 537, 414 S.E.2d 678 (1992).
54. Swanson v. Smith, 199 Ga. App. 471, 471, 405 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1991) (quoting Armstrong v. Sundance Entertainment, 179 Ga. App. 635, 636, 347 S.E.2d 292, 293 (1986)).
55. 199 Ga. App. 471, 405 S.E.2d 301 (1991).
56. Id. at 471, 405 S.E.2d at 302.
57. Id. at 472, 405 S.E.2d at 302.
58. Georgia R.R. v. Fuller, 6 Ga. App. 454, 65 S.E. 313 (1909); Starr v. Southern Ry., 4
Ga. App. 436, 61 S.E. 735 (1908).
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wrongful entry is peaceable or by mistake; the key to trespass is the
wrongful nature of the entry.["]
Thus, even though the court was careful to point out the innocent nature
of plaintiff's entry, s0 the lack of any evidence of an express or implied
invitation rendered her a trespasser, according to the legal principles
quoted above.
Practically speaking, the distinction is one without a difference in cases
such as Swanson, since. "[t]o the licensee, as to the trespasser, no duty
arises of keeping the usual condition of the premises up to any given
standard of safety, except that they must not contain pitfalls, man-traps,
and things of that character.""1 Trespassers in two survey period cases
argued without success that property owners had set mantraps for them.
In Tramell v. Baird,62 plaintiff's decedent drove his motorcycle into a
covered cable gate on defendant's land.63 Finding that the decedent
clearly had notice his presence was not permitted, the supreme court held
that the cable gate was not a mantrap, and its existence did not constitute willful and wanton negligence by defendants. 4 Likewise, in Francis
v. Haygood Contracting, Inc.,"" the court of appeals rejected plaintiff's
contention that defendant's placement of gravel on a private roadway
during construction constituted a mantrap.61 The test is whether a deliberate attempt to inflict injury can be inferred from the hazardous
condition. 7
Landlord and Tenant. Last year's torts survey questioned whether
the court of appeals had implicitly rejected the "superior knowledge" test
for actions involving a landlord's failure to repair.6 " During the survey
period, however, the court appeared to return to this traditional legal
analysis.
The "superior knowledge" test simply provides that

59. GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 4, § 4-2. See Barber v. Steele, 133 Ga. App. 290, 211
S.E.2d 133 (1974); Crosby v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 114 Ga. App. 193, 150 S.E.2d 563
(1966).
60. 199 Ga. App. at 471, 405 S.E.2d at 302.
61. Francis v. Haygood Contracting, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 74, 75, 404 S.E.2d 136, 138 (1991)
(quoting Mandeville Mills v. Dale, 2 Ga. App. 607, 610, 58 S.E. 1060, 1061 (1907)).
62. 262 Ga. 124, 413 S.E.2d 445 (1992).
63. Id. at 124, 413 S.E.2d at 445.
64. Id. at 125-26, 413 S.E.2d at 447.
65. 199 Ga. App. 74, 404 S.E.2d 136 (1991).
66. Id. at '/5, 404 S.E.2d at 138.
67. Id.
68. See Cynthia T. Adams & Charles R. Adams III, Torts, 43 MERCER L. REV. 395, 40001(1991).
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[e]ven though the condition of the premises may be hazardous and the
landlord negligent, he may not be liable for injury where the [tenant]
had equal or superior knowledge of the alleged defect. If a [tenant]
knows of a defect, "[he] must use all of [his] senses in a reasonable measure amounting to ordinary care in discovering and avoiding those things
that might cause hurt to [him].""9
Cases in recent years have evidenced a trend away from a strict application of this rule in favor of injured tenants or their guests.70 In only one
survey period case, however, did the court find the existence of a jury
question concerning the landlord's superior knowledge. In Demarest v.
Moore,7 1 plaintiffs sued their landlord after their apartment was burglarized. Plaintiffs contended the lock on the apartment's back door was not
sufficient to prevent a break-in. The court focused on whether the landlord had equal knowledge of the lock's inadequacy and an adequate time
within which to remedy it.2 Citing the landlord's statutory "responsibil[ity] for damages arising from defective construction or for damages
arising from the failure to keep the premises in repair,' 3 the court concluded that the landlord's liability would be for jury determination."4
Plaintiffs in other survey period cases did not fare so well. The court
turned away allegations that stairs were insufficiently illuminated,"s a furnace was defective,'76 and there was insufficient traffic control in an apartment complex driveway 7 on the grounds that plaintiffs in each case had
or could have had knowledge of the hazard equal to the landowner's.
Thus, like Mark Twain's death, reports of the demise of the equal knowledge doctrine in landlord-tenant cases have been "greatly exaggerated."' 8
Slip and Fall. A huge number of appeals each year concern persons
who
slip, 7 9
trip, 8 0
flip,8 "
stumble, 83
tumble, 8 "
69. Wells v. Citizens & S. Trust Co., 199 Ga. App. 31, 32, 403 S.E.2d 826, 827 (1991)
(quoting Hall v. Thompson, 193 Ga. App. 574, 574-75, 388 S.E.2d 381, 382 (1989)).
70. See, e.g., Thompson v. Crownover, 259 Ga. 126, 381 S.E.2d 283 (1989); Flagler Co. v.
Savage, 258 Ga. 335, 368 S.E.2d 504 (1988); Spence v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 195 Ga.
App. 294, 393 S.E.2d 1 (1990).
71. 201 Ga. App. 90, 410 S.E.2d 191 (1991).
72. Id. at 91, 410 S.E.2d at 192.
73. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 (1991).
74. 201 Ga. App. at 92, 410 S.E.2d at 193.

75. Wells v. Citizens & S. Trust Co., 199 Ga. App. 31, 403 S.E.2d 826 (1991).
76. Harris v. Sloan, 199 Ga. App. 340, 405 S.E.2d 68 (1991).
77. Roth v. Wu, 199 Ga. App. 665, 405 S.E.2d 741 (1991).
78. "'The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.' Mark Twain, 1897, cable from
London to the Associated Press," quoted in Hartwell v. Blasingame, 564 So. 2d 543, 545 n.2
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
79. Haire v. City of Macon, 200 Ga. App. 744, 745, 409 S.E.2d 670, 671 (1991) (plaintiff
slipped on "foreign substances" on ramp at hog show); Mallory v. Piggly Wiggly S., Inc., 200
Ga. App. 428, 429, 408 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1991) (onion peel).
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skid, 8 8
glide, 8
slide,"
misstep, 8 6
step, s '
9
9
0
drop, lurch,1 or otherwise ' lose their footing and fall on the premises of
another. In fact, the exact nature of the plaintiffs fall sometimes becomes
a material issue in the case, as in Sullenberger v.Grand Union Co. s9 In
Suttenberger plaintiff either tripped over a concrete divider in defendants' parking lot or slipped in a dark puddle of liquid. The distinction
was significant because if a static condition (the divider) created the hazard, Georgia law presents a greater likelihood of liability for the defendant than in the case of a foreign substance (the liquid).93 Asked to identify the cause of his fall, plaintiff could only state that "as opposed to a
slip or a trip, it seems to me it had to have been a trip because I fell so
far forward from where I was.""' Based on that testimony, the court construed this as a "static defect" case. The court nevertheless affirmed summary judgment for defendants, partly because of plaintiff's contributory
negligence, 5 but also because plaintiff could not definitely state that the
curb caused his fall and, in any event, plaintiff failed to produce evidence
that better lighting in the parking lot would have prevented the fall."
Several survey period "slip and fall" cases concerned the application of
the "plain view" doctrine:
80. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Hester, 201 Ga. App. 478, 411 S.E.2d 507 (1991).
81. Wilson v. Polk Medical Ctr., 200 Ga. App. 538, 408 S.E.2d 834 (1991).
82. Meriwether Memorial Hosp. Auth. v. Gresham, 202 Ga. App. 535, 414 S.E.2d 694
(1992).83. Spivey v. Vaughn, 182 Ga. App. 91, 354 S.E.2d 870 (1987).
84. Wallace v. Pointe Properties, Inc., 202 Ga. App. 537, 414 S.E.2d 678 (1992); Lawless
v. Sasnett, 200 Ga. App. 398, 408 S.E.2d 432 (1991); Beavers v. Moore, 200 Ga. App. 323,
408 S.E.2d 124 (1991).
85. Walker v. Daniels, 200 Ga. App. 150, 407 S.E.2d 70 (1991).
86. Flood v. Camp Oil Co., 201 Ga. App. 451, 411 S.E.2d 348 (1991).
87. Lam Amusement Co. v. Waddell, 105 Ga. App. 1, 123 S.E.2d 310 (1961).
88. Shiver v. Singletary, 186 Ga. App. 746, 368 S.E,2d 523 (1988).
89. Trillet v. Vulcan Materials Co., 199 Ga. App. 583, 405 S.E.2d 572 (1991).
90. Cuthbert v. MARTA, 190 Ga. App. 550, 379 S.E.2d 413 (1989).
91. Compare McConnell v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 700, 700, 391 S.E.2d
785, 785 (1990) (plaintiff's feet "shot out from under" him) with Spivey v. Board of Educ.,
194 Ga. App. 726, 726, 391 SE.2d 783, 783 (1990) (plaintiff's feet "flew out from under"
her).
92. 201 Ga. App. 194, 410 S.E.2d 381 (1991).
93. See id. at 197-98, 410 S.E.2d at 384 (McMurray, P.J., dissenting). Compare Trillet v.
Vulcan Materials Co., 199 Ga. App. 583, 405 S.E.2d 572 (1991) (owner's superior knowledge
of drop-off at rear of loading pad presented jury issue on liability) with Smith v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 808, 406 S.E.2d 234 (1991) (even if owner had constructive knowledge of spilled substance, plaintiff's equal knowledge precluded liability).
94. 201 Ga. App. at 195, 410 S.E.2d at 382.
95. Id. Plaintiff fell while chasing after a shopping cart that he had let go of and allowed
to roll off downhill. Id. at 194, 410 S.E.2d at 382.
96. Id. at 196, 410 S.E.2d at 383.
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"[O]ne is under a duty to look where he is walking and to see large objects in plain view which are at a location where they are customarily
placed and expected to be; not performing this duty may amount to a
failure to exercise ordinary care for one's safety as would bar a recovery
for resulting injuries: '' 1
In Wallace v. Pointe Properties,Inc.,98 eight judges of the court of ap-

peals concurred that the evidence presented a jury question concerning
whether the hole plaintiff stepped into was in plain view, and whether it
was in a place that it reasonably could be expected."s Despite the fact
that "[pilaintiff was under a duty to use her eyesight for the purpose of
discovering any discernible obstruction in her path," ' 0 the court in Wallace concluded that "there is evidence that the hole,was not in plain view,
but was obscured by a combination of factors."' 01
By contrast, in Lee v. Peacock,0 2 six court of appeals judges combined
to deny plaintiff any recovery for the death of her seventy-one year old
husband from complications arising out of a fall in defendant's store. 08
Adding that "[w]e are not without sympathy for the plight of appellant;
nevertheless, "(t)h'e appellate process affords us no latitude to make adjustments for the . . . heart-rending misfortune of the unlucky,"' '1 04 the
court applied the plain view doctrine to find that the pallets which plaintiff's decedent tripped over were clearly visible and posed no latent danger. 10 Therefore, despite evidence that the pallets were "sticking out
enough to trip you,"106 plaintiff could not recover.

97. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Hester, 201 Ga. App. 478, 478-79, 411 S.E.2d 507, 508
(1991) (quoting Stenhouse v. Winn Dixie Stores, 147 Ga. App. 473, 474-75, 249 S.E.2d 276,
277-78 (1978)). The courts have stated this doctrine even more graphically:
"[Tlhere should be no duty to warn of the perfectly obvious such as posting a sign
on a stairwell that 'These are steps,' or on a brick wall that caution should be
exercised as 'This is a brick wall' or a telephone pole saying, 'Beware! This is a
telephone pole.'"
Merriwether Memorial Hosp. Auth. v. Gresham, 202 Ga. App. 535, 536, 414 S.E.2d 694, 695
(1992) (quoting Forde v. Citizens & S. Ga. Corp., .178 Ga. App. 400, 402, 343 S.E.2d 164, 166
(1986)).
98. 202 Ga. App; 537, 414 S.E.2d 678 (1992).
99. Id. at 539, 414 S.E.2d at 680.
100. Id., 414 S.E.2d at 679.
101. Id.
102. 199 Ga. App. 192, 404 S.E.2d 473 (1991).
103. Id. at 194-95, 404 S.E.2d at 475-76.
104. Id.at 195, 404 S.E.2d at 476 (quoting Harman v. Reames, 188 Ga. App. 812, 814,
374 S.E.2d 539, 543 (1988)).
105. Id. at 194, 404 S.E.2d at 475.
106. Id. at 192, 404 S.E.2d at 474. Three judges, dissenting, found a jury question in this.
See id. at 196, 404 S.E.2d at 476-77 (Banke, P.J., dissenting in part).
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Malpractice

Code section 9-11-9.1 ("section 9.1"),'10 which requires the filing of an
expert witness affidavit along with the complaint in every action alleging
professional negligence, continued during the survey period as the epicenter of Georgia tort litigation.' °8 The most significant issue is when the
requirements of this section apply. Despite section 9.1's language mandating an affidavit "[i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice," ' 9 the courts have fashioned an exception to the extent the action alleges that the professional defendant's actions constituted ordinary
negligence.' 10 When the plaintiff's injury resulted from professional negligence, however, section 9.1 strictly mandates the attachment of an affidavit to the complaint.' 1
During the survey period, the supreme court endeavored, with debatable success, to establish a "bright line" test for determining who is a "professional" within the meaning of section 9.1. In Gillis v. Goodgame,1" the
court "conclud[ed] that the legislature intended for the term 'professional' as used in O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 to be defined by O.C.G.A. sections 14-7-2(2);11 3 14-10-2(2);"' and 43-1-24.["]"'11 The court thus
107. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 1992).
108. Section 9.1 generates such a volume of appellate decisions each year that legal writers are hard pressed to keep their works current with the law. For the most recent summary
of substantive law in this area, see GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 4, § 5-1. For procedural

analysis, the best source is

HARDY GREGORY, GEORGIA CIVIL PRACTICE

§ 3-3 (1990 & Supp.

1992).
109. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., Smith v. North Fulton Medical Ctr., 200 Ga. App. 464, 466, 408 S.E.2d
468, 470 (1991).
111. See, e.g., Jackson v. Department of Transportation, 201 Ga. App. 863, 865-66, 412
S.E.2d 847, 850 (1991); Sparks v. Kroger Co., 200 Ga. App. 135, 136-37, 407 S.E.2d 105, 10607 (1991).
112. 262 Ga. 117, 414 S.E.2d 197 (1992).
113. O.C.G.A. § 14-7-2(2) (1989), part of the Georgia Professional Corporation Act, defines "profession" as including "certified public accountancy, architecture, chiropractic, dentistry, professional engineering, land surveying, law, psychology, medicine and surgery, optometry, osteopathy, podiatry, veterinary medicine, registered professional nursing, or
harbor piloting." Id.
114. O.C.G.A. § 14-10-2(2) (1989), part of the Georgia Professional Association Act, defines "professional service" as follows:
[T]he personal services rendered by attorneys at law and any type of professional
service which may be legally performed only pursuant to a license from a state
examining board pursuant to Title 43, for example, the personal services rendered
by certified public accountants, chiropractors, dentists, osteopaths, physicians and
surgeons, and podiatrists (chiropodists).
Id. (emphasis added).
115. O.C.G.A. § 43-1-24 (1991) applies to "[a]ny person licensed by a state examining
board and who practices a 'profession,' as defined in. . .the 'Georgia Professional Corpora-
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adopted as the majority rule Justice Weltner's concurring opinion in
Creel v.Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co.1 17 The rationale in Gillis
was that these are the only definitions of the term "profession" contained
in the Code, so the legislature must have had reference to these definitions when it enacted section 9.1.11 In Lamb v. Candler General Hospital, Inc.,"" the court applied the test created in Gillis to deny section 9.1
protection to a hospital that supplied defective equipment.2
Like most judicial attempts to implement a "bright line" test,

21

how-

ever, Gillis and Lamb create as many problems as they purport to solve.
The key difficulty lies in the Professional Association Act's blanket definition of "professional service" as including "any type of professional service which may be legally performed only pursuant to a license from a
state examining board pursuant to Title 43. ' 122 Thus, the court has de-

fined all Title 43 occupations as "professions" for purposes of section 9.1.
This brings to pass what these writers warned of two years ago-"the
absurd result of athletic trainers, barbers, operators of billiard parlors,
junk dealers, peddlers, scrap metal processors, and used car dealers,
among others, availing themselves of the protections of section 9-119.1."'113 Meanwhile, the new rule completely omits an entire learned profession, the clergy, 12 4 from the protections of section 9.1, just at a time
of
1 2
increasing agitation for a cause of action for "clergy malpractice.

Gillis and Lamb do not represent a satisfactory resolution of this difficult question. A better approach would be for the court to return to its
earlier analysis in Housing Authority v. Greene"' that a section 9.1 affidavit is required when "it is generally necessary to admit expert testition Act,' or who renders 'professional services,' as defined in... 'The Professional Association Act.'" Id.
116. 262 Ga. at 118, 414 S.E.2d at 198.
117. 260 Ga. 499, 500-01, 397 S.E.2d '294, 295-96 (1990) (Weltner, J., concurring).
118. 262 Ga. at 118, 414 S.E.2d at 198 (citing Housing Auth. v. Greene, 259 Ga. 435, 438,
383 S.E.2d 867, 869-70 (1989)).
119., 262 Ga. 70, 413 S.E.2d 720 (1992).
120. Id. at 72, 413 S.E.2d at 722.
121. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122. O.C.G.A. § 14-10-2(2) (1989). See supra note 117.
123. Cynthia T. Adams & Charles R. Adams I1, Torts, 42 MERcER L. Rzv. 431, 441
(1990) (footnote omitted).
124. See Georgia State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Friedman's Jewelers, Inc., 183
Ga. 669, 673, 189 S.E. 238, 241 (1936) (three traditional "learned professions" are theology,
law, and, medicine).
125. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624 (Okla. 1992); Note, Clergy Malpractice: Taking Spiritual Counseling Conflicts Beyond Intentional Tort Analysis, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 419 (1988). See generally Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988); Annotation,
Cause of Action for Clergy Malpractice, 75 A.L.R. 4th 750 (1990).
126. 259 Ga. 435, 383 S.E.2d 867 (1989).
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mony . . . in order to establish the degree of skill and care ordinarily

employed by the profession."' 2 7 "This should encompass the traditional
test that expert opinions are required only concerning conclusions that
the jury could not ordinarily draw for itself, namely 'the conclusion is
"beyond the ken of the average layman,"' 28 and should be limited to
'learned professions ....
,1129 Absent decisive legislative intervention,
"
this area of law is likely to remain unsettled for the foreseeable future.
Those cases that required a section 9.1. affidavit did not lack for controversy either. Competency of the expert witness is always a major concern.
In Findley v. Davis,3 the court extended the well-settled rule that an
attorney or physician in a malpractice case may make an affidavit in his
own behalf.'8 ' The court in Findley allowed a section 9.1 affidavit by an
attorney who, although not counsel of record for plaintiff, had a financial
interest in plaintiff's case at the time he executed the affidavit.'"2 The
court rejected defendants' contention that the purpose of section 9.1, prevention of frivolous lawsuits, is defeated if parties are allowed to rely on
the affidavits of experts who lack objectivity because of a personal interest in the litigation. 38 It did so, however, not on the specific merits of
that contention, but on the ground that, because the general rule permits
a party to a malpractice case, who unquestionably has a financial stake, to
testify as an expert, there is a fortiori no inherent prejudice in testimony
by another expert with a financial interest."" The court in Findley, however, did not purport to change the general rule that "[a) lawyer shall not
pay . . . compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his

testimony or the outcome of the case."' 35 Findley should probably be limited to its facts: The section 9.1 affiant, plaintiff's original lawyer, had
referred the case to other counsel prior to executing the affidavit, and he
renounced any financial interest in the case prior to the summary judgment hearing. 36
Not only the witness' interest in the case, but also his qualifications,
are subject to challenge on grounds of competence. In a five-judge majority opinion in Morris v. Chandler Exterminators,"7 the court of appeals
127.
128.
Smith
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 436, 383 S.E.2d at 868 (emphasis added).
Walker v. Bishop, 169 Ga. App. 236, 240-41, 312 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1983) (quoting
v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981)).
Adams & Adams, supra note 123, at 441.
202 Ga. App. 332, 414 S.E.2d 317 (1991).
See, e.g., Rose v. Rollins, 167 Ga. App. 469, 471, 306 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1983).
202 Ga. App. at 334, 414 S.E.2d at 318.
Id.
See id.
GEORGIA RULES OF COURT ANN. State Bar Rules, Rule 4-102, Standard 58 (1989).
202 Ga. App. at 334, 414 S.E.2d at 318.
200 Ga. App. 816, 409 S.E.2d 677 (1991).
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held that a psychologist was qualified to provide an opinion about the
organic cause of a mental disorder, and hence was competent to oppose
defendant's summary judgment motion in a personal injury action arising
from negligent application of chemicals.'3 8 Holding that "[many health
care providers other than medical doctors possess substantial expertise as
to medical matters,"13 the court determined that "since psychologists are
entitled, by statute, to diagnose and treat mental and nervous disorders,
it is incongruous to prohibit these same health care providers from testifying concerning the cause of an affliction which lies within the area embraced by their practice. ' "'0
The dissent took the position that the causal relationship between inhalation of chemicals and a subsequent physical condition was a medical
question. Thus, said the dissent, "[i]f a patient's mental disorder is of
organic etiology, because the psychologist's training does not include the
medical causes of these physical problems, he should not be allowed to
testify thereon." '
Medical Malpractice. Although "[tihe law does not require the use
of 'magic words' to constitute a case-saving expert opinion,"' 2 to create
an issue of fact in a medical malpractice case, the expert witness "must
establish 'the parameters of acceptable professional conduct,'

. .

. [and]

set forth specific facts as the basis for reaching the conclusion that treatment did not meet the standard of care.' " 3 This obviously requires that

the afflant apply the proper standard of care. When the claim is one alleging inadequacy of hospital services or facilities, courts apply the locality
rule. This rule "limits a hospital's duty to its patients to exercising ordinary care in furnishing facilities and equipment reasonably suited to the
intended uses and comparable to those in general use in area hospitals
. .. ., Ross v. Chatham County Hospital Authority,14 a case that has
been litigated with Dickensian thoroughness,'4 was ,back before the court
138.

Id, at 818, 409 S.E.2d at 679.

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 820, 409 S.E.2d at 680 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
142. Dent v. Memorial Hosp., Inc., 200 Ga. App. 499, 503, 408 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1991).
143. Kirk v. Ashley, 199 Ga. App. 805, 807, 406 S.E.2d 82, 84 (1991) (quoting
Beauchamp v. Wallace, 180 Ga. App. 554, 555, 349 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1986)).
144. GEORGIA TORTs, supra note 4, § 5-2.
145. 200 Ga. App. 448, 408 S.E.2d 490 (1991).
146. In Chatham County Hosp. Auth. v. Ross, 184 Ga. App. 660, 362 S.E.2d 390 (1987),
rev'd, 258 Ga. 234, 367 S.E.2d 793 (1988), the court of appeals rejected the trial court's
,conclusion that the hospital was liable for the torts of its operating room personnel, holding
that the "borrowed servant" doctrine insulated the hospital from liability. 184 Ga. App. at
661, 362 S.E.2d at 392. In Ross v. Chatham County Hosp., 258 Ga. 234, 367 S.E.2d 793
(1988), the supreme court held that the negligent act in question, failure to count surgical
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of appeals during the survey period on the issue of the application of the
locality rule. In a full bench opinion, the court ruled that the locality rule
is not automatically applicable whenever the alleged negligence involves
an administrative or clerical error. 14 7 The controlling consideration is
whether the rationale for the locality rule is present. In this case, said the
court, it was not, "inasmuch as the ability of an operating room employee
to count the surgical instruments. . obviously would not be affected by
the size or location of the hospital. ' 148 The court thus adopted for adminthe same rule that applies when professional judgment is
istrative tasks
49s
involved.
Legal Malpratice. "'[A) claim for legal malpractice is sui generis insofar as the plaintiff's proof of damages effectively requires proof that he
would have prevailed in the original litigation.' "150 In three separate survey period cases, each panel of the court of appeals had occasion to apply
some version of this rule.
In Fine & Block v. Evans, 5 ' defendants negligently failed to perfect
plaintiff's appeal in the original litigation. Applying the logical corollary

instruments, was an administrative or clerical act to which the borrowed servant doctrine
would not apply. Id. at 236, 367 S.E.2d at 795. The court declined to reach the issue of the
local standard of care, remanding it to the trial court. Id. at 236, 367 S.E.2d at 795. "On
remand, the trial court entered summary judgment for the hospital as to the entire complaint, thereby implicitly ruling that there were no other alleged acts of negligence 'by its
operating room employees which could be considered administrative in nature." 200 Ga.
App. at 449, 408 S.E.2d at 492. The Delancy case, discussed supra notes 35-39, and accompanying text, also ultimately arose from these facts.
"You are further to reflect, Mr. Woodcourt ... that on the numerous difficulties,
contingencies, masterly fictions, and forms of procedure in this great cause, there
has been expended study, ability, eloquence, knowledge, intellect, Mr. Woodcourt,
high intellect. For many years the-a-I would say the flower of the Bar, and
the-a-I would presume to add, the matured autumnal fruits of the Woolsack-have been lavished upon Jarndyce and Jarndyce. If the public have the
benefit, and the country have the adornment, of this great Grasp, it must be paid
for in money or money's worth, sir."
"Mr. Kenge," said Allan, appearing enlightened all in a moment. "Excuse me,
our time presses. Do I understand that the whole estate is found to have been
absorbed in costs?"
"Hem! I believe so," returned Mr. Kenge.
CHARLES DIcKENS, BLEAK HOUSE Ch. 65

(London 1853).

147. 200 Ga. App. at 451, 408 S.E.2d at 493.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Gusky v. Candler Gen. Hosp., 192 Ga. App. 521, 522-23, 385 S.E.2d 698,
700 (1989); Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Ross, 176 Ga. App. 221, 223, 335 S.E.2d 633,
636 (1985).
150. Nix v. Crews, 200 Ga. App. 58, 59, 406 S.E.2d 566, 567 (1991) (quoting McDow v.
Dixon, 138 Ga. App. 338, 338, 226 S.E.2d 145, 146 (1976)).
151. 201 Ga. App. 294, 411 S.E.2d 73 (1991).
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of the rule quoted above, the court held that a determination of whether
an appeal would have been successful is crucial to the question of proximate cause in such a case.'"2 However, this determination is a pure question of law, according to the court in Evans, which proceeded to adjudicate the merits of the disputed appeal against plaintiff, thus reversing the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment. s
A different panel of the court of appeals reached a sharply contrasting
result in Hipple v. Brick."" Plaintiff in that case alleged that defendant
attorney negligently failed to file an appeal. Defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that the judgment against plaintiff in the
original litigation would have been affirmed on appeal in any event. 165
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court's denial of the motion:
"We, no more than can the trial court in this case, 'address the merits of
the hypothetical appeal,' as this Court was equipped to do in Fine &
Block . . ."50
The difficulty with this result is that, if the validity of the "hypothetical appeal" must be addressed as a pure question of law on summary
judgment, as the court held in Fine & Block, when should that determination have been made in Hipple? Presumably, if the evidence is in disputs regarding the viability of the appeal, as appeared to be the case in
Hipple, the trial court should hear that evidence and make a legal ruling
on the issue of liability before sending the case to the jury.15 7
Yet a third appellate panel applied the general rule to a very different
type of appeal in Mauldin v. Weinstock.'" Defendant's alleged negligence
in that case consisted of failure to file a timely appeal for investigation of
plaintiff's discharge to a stated arbitration authority within the time pro152. In the context of a legal malpractice case in which the negligence alleged is the
failure of an attorney to file or perfect an appeal, proximate cause may be established by showing that the appellate court would have reversed and that upon
remand to the lower court the client would have obtained a more favorable result.
Id. at 295, 411 S.E.2d at 74 (citing Millhouse v. Wiesenthal, 775 S.W.2d 626,,627 (Tex.
1989)).
153. The court reached this result, not by constituting itself as a bizzare panel of expert
witnesses, but by reviewing the merits of the underlying appeal to determine whether the
trial court's failure to do so was harmful error. Id.
154. 202 Ga. App. 571, 415 S.E.2d 182 (1992).
155. Id. at 572, 415 S.E.2d at 183.
156. Id. at 573, 415 S.E.2d at 184 (quoting 201 Ga. App. at 295, 411 S.E.2d at 74).
157. The decision about the proper resolution of a petition or appeal must and can
be made by the trial judge as an issue of law, based upon review of the transcript
and record of the underlying action, the argument of counsel, and subject to the
same rules of review as should have been applied to the ...

appeal.

2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24.39, at 537 (3d ed. 1989).
158. 201 Ga. App. 514, 411 S.E.2d 370 (1991).

TORTS
vided by plaintiff's union cbntract. 15' The court of appeals made short
work of the resultant malpractice claim, holding that plaintiff had waived
his right to pursue such a claim by failing to authorize defendant to take
additional steps to secure plaintiff's rights in the original litigation.16 In
this case, appropriate action would have been to allow defendant to initiate a lawsuit to compel plaintiff's employer to arbitrate the discharge.
Because it was undisputed that plaintiff did not authorize defendant to
bring such a suit,'" "it has never been established . . . that [defendant]
.has filed a late 'appeal for investigation'; and the trial court correctly concluded that the question of whether [the employer's decision not to arbitrate] was legally correct was never answered. 1 6 2 Because plaintiff had
waived his opportunity to have his rights judicially determined in the
original litigation, he also forfeited his right to sue for malpractice.
"[A]Ithough it is an issue of first impression," said the court, "we find
that the trial court did not err in thus concluding that 'we cannot now
permit Mr. Mauldin to sue his former attorney for failure to timely file an
appeal ["for investigation"] when he would not permit his attorney to
pursue this course [by litigation] in the first instance.' ,63

III. NEGLIGENCE DEFENSES
A.

Proximate Cause Defenses

The foreseeability of injury is always a necessary element in determining proximate cause liability. 16 In Newsome v. Department of Human
Resources,' "6 the court of appeals upheld the grant of summary judgment
to defendants on this issue."' Plaintiffs' decedent, a minor child, had
been burned to death while residing in the home of his defendant foster
parents. Decedent's four-year old sister had started the fire while playing
with matches she had obtained from her sleeping foster mother's purse.
The record indicated that no foster child had ever been injured while in
the care of decedent's foster parents during their more than nine-year
tenure as foster parents for the Department of Family and Children's
Services and that decedent's sister had never shown any propensity to
159. Id. at 515, 411 S.E.2d at 371.
160. Id. at 520, 411 S.E.2d at 374.
161. Id. at 515-16, 411 S.E.2d at 371.
162. Id. at 517-18, 411 S.E.2d at 372-73.
163. Id. at 520, 411 S.E.2d at 374.
164. See generally Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.A. v. Coleman, 260 Ga.
569, 398 S.E.2d 16 (1990); Jackson v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 329, 378 S.E.2d 726 (1989); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Ellis, 54 Ga. App. 783, 189 S.E.2d 559 (1937).
165. 199 Ga. App. 419, 405 S.E.2d 61 (1991).
166. Id. at 419, 405 S.E.2d at 62.
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play with, matches, nor had she shown any fascination with fire. 167 In light
of this evidence, the court held that it was not rbasonably foreseeable that
decedent's sister "'would obtain a small box of matches from [her foster
mother's] handbag and would set the house afire . . . .Even less was it
foreseeable to DHR or [its employees] that placement of the children
with these foster parents . . . [would cause such an incident to
occur].'
8

A business proprietor must exercise due care to prevent injury to his
patrons from reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of others.""9 In Confetti
Atlanta, Ltd. v. Gray,"O plaintiff Gray, a patron of defendant nightclub,

was injured when Cooley, another club patron, ran over him with a
pickup truck just moments after they had been involved in an altercation

in defendant's parking lot.17 ' The evidence at trial had shown that prior
fights had occurred both inside and outside the nightclub and that there
was no security guard on duty outside the club while patrons exiting it

remained in the parking lot. 172 Defendant argued that Cooley's running
over plaintiff with a truck was not an incident that it could reasonably
have foreseen from prior parking lot fights.1 7 8 In rejecting defendant's
contentions and affirming the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff, the court
found that Gray
suffered his injuries as the result of an argument which turned into a
violent fight .... To focus on the instrumentality which caused [Gray's]
injuries rather than the circumstances which set into motion the chain of
events leading to the attack on [Gray] would require us to treat Cooley's
attack on [Gray] as an isolated criminal attack rather than the extension
17
of an uncontained, uninterrupted fight.
167.. Id. at 423-24, 405 S.E.2d at 65.
168. Id. at 425, 405 S.E.2d at 66 (quoting the trial court's opinion).
169. See generally Fowler v. Robertson, 178 Ga. App. 703, 344 S.E.2d 425 (1986); Bowling v. Janmar, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 53, 234 S.E.2d 849 (1977).
170. 202 Ga. App. 241, 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991).
171. Id. at 241, 414 S.E.2d at 266.
172. Id. at 242-43, 414 S.E.2d at 267-68.
173. Id. at 242, 414 S.E.2d at 267.
174. Id. at 243, 414 S.E.2d at 267. Compare Knudson v. Lenny's, Inc., 202 Ga. App. 85,
413 S.E.2d 258 (1991), in which the court held as a matter of law that defendant nightclub's
failure to exclude an unknown underage patron who assaulted plaintiff was not negligent,
because defendant could not have reasonably foreseen the underage patron's actions. Id. at
87, 413 S.E.2d at 261.
Two other cases of interest decided during this survey period in which the intervening
criminal acts of a third party were deemed unforeseeable because of a lack of substantially
similar prior acts were Savannah College of'Art & Design, Inc. v. Roe, 261 Ga. 764, 409
S.E.2d 848 (1991) (sexual assault upon students living in defendant's dormitory), and
Wayne County Bd. of Educ. v. Watts, 201 Ga. App. 777, 412 S.E.2d 541 (1991) (student
injured when another student threw him onto a concrete patio during a recess period).
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B. Limitation of Actions
In Miles v. Ashland Chemical Co., 1 " te

Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-

peals certified to the Supreme Court of Georgia the following question:
"Do the Georgia courts follow the discovery rule in applying the statute
of limitations to a wrongful death action alleging a failure to warn?" 176
The three decedents in this case all died from cancer after exposure to
Methylene Chloride at their place of employment. Plaintiffs did not, however, discover that Methylene Chloride could be a cancer causing agent
until substantially more than two years had passed since decedents'
deaths.17 7 The majority reiterated the established Georgia law that a
wrongful death action accrues at death17'8 and recited public policy
against potentially infinite liability '7 9 in support of their ruling not to apply the discovery rule to wrongful death claims. 6 0 In a scathing dissent,
Presiding Justice Smith urged the comparison of the discovery rule in
this type of situation to Georgia's criminal procedure, which keeps open
the prosecution period for any crime when the crime or the criminal is
unknown.'8 He further offered a telling glimpse at the nature of tort litigation in the future:
The danger we face today comes in a far more furtive manner through
toxins and carcinogens that do not instantly maim or kill, but that destroy life cell-by-cell, slowly, painfully, and as finally as any major physical trauma. The people who commit homicide with these toxins and carcinogens are just as culpable as those who commit homicide with
exploding boilers. Our public policy requires that these people be punished and the survivors be compensated. Those goals can only be
achieved by tolling the statutes until the causal link and the tortfeasor
are discovered.18'
175. 261 Ga. 726, 410 S.E.2d 240 (1991).
176. Id. at 726, 410 S.E.2d at 240. Simply stated, under the discovery rule a personal
injury action does not accrue until the injured party is able to determine the cause of the
injury. See Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 258 Ga. 365, 368 S.E.2d
732 (1988); Everhart v. Rich's, Inc., 229 Ga. 798, 194 S.E.2d 425 (1979); Hickey v. Askren,
198 Ga. App. 718, 403 S.E.2d 225 (1991); King v. Seitzingers, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 318, 287
S.E.2d 252 (1981).
177. 261 Ga. at 727, 410 S.E.2d at 290. Wrongful death actions carry a two-year limitations period. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (1982); McAuley v. Wills, 251 Ga. 3, 303 S.E.2d 258 (1983).
178. See Lovett v. Garvin, 232 Ga. 747, 208 S.E.2d 838 (1974); Glover v. Savannah, Fla.
& W. Ry., 107 Ga. 34, 32 S.E. 876 (1899).
179. See Atlantic V. & W.R.R. Coal v. McDilda, 125 Ga. 468, 54 S.E. 140 (1906);
Leathers v. Gilland, 141 Ga. App. 681, 234 S.E.2d 336 (1977).
180. 261 Ga. at 728, 410 S.E.2d at 291-92.
181. 261 Ga. at 732, 410 S.E.2d at 294 (Smith, P.J., dissenting). See O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2(2)
(1990).
182. 261 Ga. at 733-34, 410 S.E.2d at 295 (Smith, P.J., dissenting).

394

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

Two other cases decided during this survey period illustrate the difficulties inherent in applying the discovery rule doctrine and present'an
interesting juxtaposition of the relationship between this doctrine and
medical diagnoses. In Thomason v.Gold Kist, Inc., 8s plaintiffs argued
that the two-year statute of limitations' 84 did not begin to run against
until physicians diagnosed plaintiffs as having symptoms condefendants
sistent with Chlordane poisoningy""
even though they had experienced

physical problems shortly after they had begun using a pesticide containing Chlordane in their home several years earlier. 8 6 The court did not
accept this argument and held that the statute of limitations began to run
in this case much earlier when plaintiffs "suspected that Chlordane was
the cause of their injuries ....,,187 Likewise, in the case of Deans v.Dain
Management, Inc.,'" the court recited "that a medical diagnosis is [not]
necessary before the statute of limitation begins to run. .

."89 Without

determining exactly when the limitations period began to run in this case,
however, the court found that plaintiff's complaint had been timely
filed,190 even though plaintiff had been aware for several years that some
of her co'workers had experienced problems with formaldehyde exposure
in the workplace, and she knew her own symptoms cleared up when she
was away from that environment."8
Actual fraud that involves moral turpitude and that prevents a plaintiff
from bringing a cause of action will toll the statute of limitations until the
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the fraud. 192 The court
found that this type of fraud existed in the case of Hahne v. Wylly '
when defendant's assurances to plaintiff that her swimming pool installa183. 200 Ga; App. 246, 407 S.E. 2d 472 (1991).
184. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (1982).
185. 200 Ga. App. at 247, 407 S.E.2d at 474.
186. Id.'at 248-49, 407 S.E.2d at 474-75.
187. Id. at 249, 407 S.E.2d at 475.
188. 201 Ga. App. 466, 411 S.E.2d 354 (1991).
189. Id. at 470, 411 S.E.2d at 357.
190. Plaintiff filed the complaint on February 29, 1988. Of the dates relevant to this
cause of action, it is interesting to note that on February 24, 1986, plaintiff returned to work
and began, once again, experiencing physical problems that had subsided while she was absent from her workplace. Within a few days thereafter plaintiff sought medical treatment
from an allergist who had treated some of her coworkers and was subsequently diagnosed as
having formaldehyde sensitization. Id. at 467, 411 S.E.2d at 355. In spite of its denial
thereof, the court seemed to be seeking a medical confirmation of plaintiff's ailment in this
instance before deeming that the two-year statute of limitation had begun to run.
191. Id. at 466-67, 411 S.E.2d at 354-55.
192. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 (1982); Shipman v. Horizon Corp., 245 Ga. 808, 267 S.E.2d
244 (1980); Arnall, Golden & Gregory v. Health Serv. Ctrs., 197 Ga. App. 791, 399 S.E.2d
565 (1990); Smith v. Alimenta Processing Corp., 197 Ga. App. 57, 397 S.E.2d 444 (1990).
193. 199 Ga. App. 811, 406 S.E.2d 94 (1991).

TORTS
tion would have no effect on the operation of her septic tank tolled the
limitations period until plaintiff actually began experiencing problems
with her septic tank. "
C. Assumption of the Risk
Once again the court of appeals in Beringause v. Fogleman Truck
Lines, Inc.195 seemingly acted as an "appellate jury" to reverse the trial
jury's verdict in favor of a defendant'"9-this time on the grounds of an
erroneously given charge on assumption of the risk.197 In Beringause
plaintiff's decedent, a policeman, participated in a convoy consisting of
two buses and three campus police cars that travelled "down a two-lane
highway, straddling the occasional passing lane so no other vehicles could
intervene or pass, sometimes exceeding the speed limit, and using flashing
blue lights on the lead and last vehicles .

. . ."

As observed by vehicles

following behind, the convoy prompted some oncoming vehicles to stop,
slow down, or pull off the highway. Plaintiff's decedent was killed when
an oncoming vehicle suddenly stopped in the highway upon meeting the
caravan, causing a tractor-trailer following behind the vehicle to brake
and ultimately collide with the decedent's car.'"
Succinctly stated, the doctrine of assumption of the risk includes
knowledge of the danger involved, an understanding of the risk associated
194. Id.at 812-13, 406 S.E.2d at 96. In making this decision, the court specifically found
that the damage defendant caused was concealed 24 inches below the ground, that defendant had related to plaintiff that only a three-foot segment of drain pipe had been removed
when evidence showed much more had been removed, and that other evidence showed that
her. type of septic tank system could still function for a while after a portion of its drain
system was removed. Id., 406 S.E.2d at 95-96. For two other cases decided during this survey period, the court determined that the alleged fraud involved would not cause the applicable statute of limitations to be tolled. Padgett v. Klaus, 201 Ga. App. 399, 411 S.E.2d 126
(1991) (no fraud concerning existence of medical diagnosis when plaintiff sought care of
another physician while still under defendant's care); Capra v.Rogers, 200 Ga. App. 131,
407 S.E.2d 101 (1991) (no fraud concerning defendant's whereabouts when defendant had
lived at same location all along even though his neighbors told sheriff's deputy that defendant no longer resided at that location.)
195. 200 Ga. App. 822, 409 S.E.2d 524 (1991).
196. See the discussion of Ellis v. Dalton, 194 Ga. App. 114, 389 S.E.2d 797 (1989), in
Adams & Adams, supra note 123, at 453-54, in which the court of appeals reversed the
jury's verdict in favor of defendant by holding that the evidence did not support the charge
on the doctrine of sudden emergency that the trial court had given. Ellis, 194 Ga. App. at
116, 389 S.E.2d at 799.
197. 200 Ga. App. at 825, 409 S.E.2d at 526-27.
198. Id. at 826, 409 S.E.2d at 528.
199. Id. at 826-27, 409 S.E.2d at 528 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
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with the danger, and a voluntary exposure to that risk. 200 Without focusing at all upon the question of whether or not participation in a caravan
of this nature created an appreciable danger, the majority concluded as a
matter of law that the caravan was not a risk-producing danger, and the
decedent could not have assumed the risk that another vehicle might
swerve across the roadway into his lane of travel.2 In a well-reasoned
dissent, however, Judge Beasley argued that the danger of the caravan
was the manner in which other vehicles reacted to it, which in turn could
endanger others."' 2 As did Judge Birdsong in his dissent to Ellis v. Dal-

ton,10 3 she chided: "The question of whether the caravan created a danger
is one of fact for the jury to decide, not the appellate court. 2 02"
Conversely, in two other survey period cases, Wells v. Citizens &
Southern Trust Co.2 0 6 and Munger v. Central of Georgia Railroad,20 the
court held as a matter of law that plaintiffs assumed the risks of their
actions.20 The court deemed plaintiff in Wells to have assumed the risk
of traversing a darkened stairway outside his apartment,0 2 while the
court deemed plaintiff in Munger to have assumed the risk of walking
0
upon a train trestle in darkness .2
D. Delay in Service
For two factually unusual cases decided during this survey period, the
trial courts' dismissals based on delays in service" were reversed. In
200. See generally Cagle v. Thorpe, 193 Ga. App. 576, 388 S.E.2d 533 (1989); Yandle v.
Alexander, 116 Ga. App. 165, 156 S.E.2d 504 (1967).
201. 200 Ga. App. at 826, 409 S.E.2d at 528.
202. Id. (Beasley, J., dissenting).
203. 194 Ga. App. 114, 389 S.E.2d 797 (1989). In that case Judge Birdsong admonished
that "[tlhere is no place in the [sudden emergency] doctrine for second guessing by this
court whether there was in fact an emergency or whether the choice made was reasonable to
us." Id. at 119, 384 S.E.2d at 802 (Birdsong, P.J., dissenting).
204. 200 Ga. App. at 827, 409 S.E.2d at 528 (Beasley, J., dissenting). Compare Beringause with the recent decision in Silva v. Smalls, 200 Ga. App. 141, 407 S.E.2d 110 (1991),
which, after noting the dangerousness of plaintiff's job as a tractor-trailer inspector, found
that the jury was authorized to conclude plaintiff assumed the risk of being run over by such
a rig. Id. at 143, 407 S.E.2d at 112-13.
205. 199 Ga. App. 31, 403 S.E.2d 826 (1991).
206. 199 Ga. App. 301, 404 S.E.2d 647 (1991).
207. 199 Ga. App. at 32, 403 S.E.2d at 828; 199 Ga. App. at 302-03, 404 S.E.2d at 649.
208. 199 Ga. App. at 32, 403 S.E.2d at 828. Plaintiff in this case knew that the overhead
light on the stairway he used was out, and he had another stairway exit from his apartment.
Id. at 31, 403 S.E.2d at 827.
209. 199 Ga. App. at 302-03, 404 S.E.2d at 649. Cf. OLIVE ANN BURNS, COLD SASSY TREE
Ch. 12 (1984).
210. When a defendant is served with a complaint after the applicable statute of limitations has run, the plaintiff must use due diligence in perfecting service so that it will relate
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Slater v. Blount,2 1 plaintiffs, within the statutory time period, effected
what the court later determined to be improper service of process upon
defendant.2 2 A little more than a month subsequent to that ruling, plaintiffs sought permission to and did serve defendant by publication. By that
time, however, approximately a year had passed since, the refiling of the
complaint and the running of the statute of limitations.2 18 In its ruling
dismissing the case, the trial court found that' plaintiffs had not been diligent in perfecting service since "it did not occur until almost one year
after the expiration of the statute of limitations .

,,. 14 The court of

appeals held the finding of a lack of due diligence based on the entire
lapse of time from when the limitations period expired until the time of
service by publication to be improper.2 10 Instead, the court of appeals
found the- relevant time period to be "from the order finding that the
prior service was ineffective until the plaintiffs sought approval of their
request for service-by publication.

216

Since a ruling had not been made

217
on this basis, the trial court's judgment was reversed.
In Starr v. Wimbush,21 8 defendant received personal service of plaintiff's complaint approximately seven months after the running of the statute of limitations, which the trial court ruled did not show an exercise of
due diligence in perfecting service.2 1 Two months prior to the personal
service, however, plaintiff had obtained an order for service by publication which expressly found that "defendant could not be found 'after due
diligence.' "212 The court of appeals determined that the trial court had
abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's complaint "[b]ecause due
diligence had already been found as of June 30, and the record shows
several additional steps were taken to locate defendant between June 30
and the date he was served less than two months later .... "1221
When a defendant's address is known or readily ascertainable, a plaintiff must actively pursue service upon the defendant. In Nee v. Dixon,222

back to the time the complaint was filed. See Chance v. Planters Rural Tel. Coop,, Inc., 219
Ga. 1, 131 S.E.2d 541 (1963); Pickens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 Ga. App. 550, 398
S.E.2d 792 (1990).
211. 200 Ga. App. 470, 408 S.E.2d 433 (1991).
212. Id. at 472, 408 S.E.2d at 435.
213. Id. at 471-72, 408 S.E.2d at 435.
214. Id. at 472, 408 S.E.2d at 435.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 473, 408 S.E.2d at 436.
217. Id.
218. 201 Ga. App. 280, 410 S.E.2d 776 (1991).
219. Id. at 280-81, 410 S.E.2d at 777.
220. Id. at 282, 410 S.E.2d at 778. Interestingly, the judge who issued this order was not
the same one who eventually dismissed the complaint. Id.
221. Id.
222. 199 Ga. App. 729, 405 S.E.2d 766 (1991).
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even though plaintiff had defendant's correct address, plaintiff did not
perfect service until 206 days after filing the complaint.2 " Plaintiff had a
great deal of difficulty locating defendant and was given misinformation
by the sheriff's department,22 4 but the appellate court found a lack of due
diligence in these efforts, stating "[tlhe appointment of a special process
server and the apparent error of the deputy sheriff did not absolve [plaintiff] of the obligation to obtain the necessary information and serve [defendant] promptly, for she 'cannot excuse her lack of diligence by attempting to place responsibility on others.' ",220 Service was also deemed
dilatory in Dunson v. Golden22 s when defendant's address had always
been available from his insurer, but plaintiff did not perfect service upon
defendant for over six months from the date of filing the complaint.22
E. Immunities
The major event in the area of immunities during this survey period

2 28
was the General Assembly's passage of the Georgia Tort Claims Act.

Responding to the ratification of the 1991 amendment to the Georgia
Constitution that effectively reinstated sovereign immunity,2 2 9 the 1992

General Assembly set forth the manner and the circumstances under
which a tort claim may be brought against the state.2 ° Space limitations
in this Article permit only a brief overview of this new Act, and the authors caution that a comprehensive reading of its entire text should be
undertaken before any lawsuit is filed against the state to avoid any pitfalls for the unwary. The Act waives the state's sovereign immunity "for
the torts of state officers and employees while acting within the scope of
223. Id. at 729-30, 405 S.E.2d at 767.
224. Plaintiff had obtained defendant's address from the accident report and filed her
complaint in Fulton County. She was informed the following week by the sheriff's department that the address she had provided was not in Fulton County. Ultimately, however, the
original address was found to be in Fulton County. Id.
225. Id. at 730, 405 S.E.2d at 768 (quoting Walker v. Hoover, 191 Ga. App. 859, 861, 383
S.E.2d 208, 209 (1989)); see also Robinson v. Stuck, 194 Ga. App. 311, 390 S.E.2d 603
(1990). Cf. Bennett v. Matt Gay Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 348, 408 S.E.2d
111 (1991) (plaintiff not dilatory when correct service address provided to sheriff's office,
but service not perfected for 13 days).
226. 199 Ga. App. 513, 405 S.E.2d 332 (1991).
227. Id. at 514, 405 S.E.2d at 333.
228. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 to -36 (Supp. 1992).
229. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, para. 9. Efforts to enjoin the ratification of this amendment
on the grounds of ambiguity in ballot language have failed. See Burton v. Georgia, 953 F.2d
1266 (11th Cir. 1992); Donaldson v. DOT, 262 Ga. 49, 414 S.E.2d 638 (1992).
230. By specific definition the provisions of this Act apply only to state entities, which
do not include "counties, municipalities, school districts, other units of local government,
hospital authorities, or housing and other local authorities." O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22(5) (Supp.
1992).
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their official duties or employment ....
,,23' There are, however, a number of statutorily imposed exceptions to this liability.232 Individual state
officers and employees should no longer be named as parties to a lawsuit
against the state,233 and prior to filing a complaint, specific notice of the
claim must have been given to the state within twelve months from the
date a loss was discovered or should have been discovered . 4 The Act's
damages limitation provision caps the maximum recovery at one million
dollars for a single occurrence of liability, with aggregate liability per occurrence not to exceed three million dollars.2 " In addition, the Act does
not permit punitive damages."' 6
The 1991 sovereign immunity amendment spurred action among state
legislators and the supreme court. In Donaldson v. Department of Trans23 7
portation,
the court considered the issue of whether the 1991 amendment should be applied retroactively to bar a claim that accrued and was
filed prior to January 1, 1991. 2 8 Arguing from Goolsby v. Regents of the
University System, 2s 9 defendants claimed that a waiver of sovereign immunity was an act of grace from the state and could be withdrawn at any
time, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over plaintiff.240 The
supreme court declared that since the amendment itself was silent on the

231. Id. § 50-21-23(a).
232. Id. § 50-21-24. These exceptions include acts or omissions in the execution of statutes, regulations, rules, or ordinances; performance of or failure to perform a discretionary
function (it should also be noted that the Act itself defines a "discretionary function or
duty," Id. § 50-21-22(2), which seems to be more narrowly drawn than the traditional case
law definitions; see generally Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329, 264 S.E.2d 878 (1980)); assessment or collection of any tax or detention of goods by law enforcement officers; legislative, judicial, or prosecutorial action or inaction; administrative action or inaction; civil disturbance or riot or the failure to provide or method of providing law enforcement or fire
protection; assualt, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, or interference with contractual rights; inspection powers or functions; licensing powers or functions; highway and other public works designs when prepared
in substantial compliance with generally accepted engineering or design standards; financing
regulatory activities; and, Georgia National Guard activities. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24.
233. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25 (Supp. 1992).
234. Id. § 50-21-26. See BROWN's GEORGIA FORMS § 50-21-26 Form 1 (2d ed. supp. 1992).
It should be noted that while the effective date of this Act is July 1, 1992, a specific provision makes the Act's application for accrued claims retroactive to January 1, 1991. O.C.G.A.
§ 50-21-27 (Supp. 1992).
235. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-29 (Supp. 1992).
236. Id. § 50-21-30.
237. 262 Ga. 49, 414 S.E.2d 638 (1992).
238. The election ratifying this amendment was held on November 6, 1990, and the
amendment became effective on January 1, 1991. GA, CONST. art. X, § 1, para. 6. The complaint in Donaldson had been filed on June 3, 1988. 262 Ga. at 53, 414 S.E.2d at 642.
239, 141 Ga. App. 605, 234 S.E.2d 165 (1977).
240. 262 Ga. at 53, 414 S.E.2d at 641.
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issue of retroactive application, it should only be applied prospectively 24 1
The holding went further, however, to conclude that while the state may
withdraw a waiver of sovereign immunity at any time, the withdrawal will
not be effective against those individuals who have acted in reliance upon
the waiver by filing a lawsuit. 42 "A waiver of sovereign immunity is binding on the state with respect to any pending action. Goolsby. . .is disapproved to the extent it holds otherwise .... ,,243
The issue of sovereign immunity in relation to hospital authorities also
provided a fertile ground for appellate review during this survey period.
Relying on the now questionable court of appeals decision in Hospital
Authority v. Litterilla, 44 the courts in Walker v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospi24
tal Authority 45 and Culberson v.Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority 0
found that hospital authorities are entitled to the defense of governmental immunity to the extent that it had not been waived by the existence
of liability insurance. 2 7 Additionally, the court in Culberson found that
the receipt of county funds by defendant hospital authority for indigent
care did not thwart a sovereign immunity defense by divesting the authority's character as an agency of the county operated primarily for public benefit rather than for revenue generating purposes. 4 8 In reversing the
court of appeals decision in Litterilla,2 49 the supreme court did not deal
directly with the general application of sovereign immunity to hospital
authorities,2 5 0 butheld that defendant hospital authority's Umbrella Lia-

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. The holding in Donaldson on this issue was also applied in the following survey
period cases: Boyd v. Georgia Dept. of Natural Resources, 262 Ga. 78, 414 S.E.2d 655 (1992);
Papp v. Hall County, 262 Ga. 72, 414 S.E.2d 655 (1992); Hiers v. City of Barwick, 262 Ga.
129, 414 S.E.2d 647 (1992).
244. 199 Ga. App. 345, 404 S.E.2d 796 (1991). The precedential authority of this case for
any purpose is questioned because of the supreme court's reversal of it (on the question of
the'self-insurance waiver of sovereign immunity) in Litterilla v. Hospital Auth., 262 Ga. 34,
413 S.E.2d 718 (1992), and the subsequent vacating of the entire opinion by the court of
appeals. Hospital Auth. v. Litterilla, 204 Ga. App. 4, 418 S.E.2d 391 (1992).
245. 200 Ga. App. 750, 409 S.E.2d 529 (1991).
246. 201 Ga. App. 347, 411 S.E.2d 75 (1991).
247. 200 Ga. App. at 750, 409 S.E.2d at 530; 201 Ga. App. at 348, 411 S.E.2d at 77. These
holdings should be viewed with caution for the reasons discussed supra note 244.
248. 201 Ga. App. at 348-49, 411 S.E.2d at 77. See generally Wright v. City Council, 78
Ga. 241, 2 S.E. 239 (1886); Cleghorn v. City of Albany, 184 Ga. App. 732, 362 S.E.2d 386
(1987); Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 171 Ga. App. 296, 319 S.E.2d 506 (1984).
249. Litterilla v. Hospital Auth., 262 Ga. 34, 413 S.E.2d 718 (1992).
250. "Although there is arguable merit to the position that hospital authorities are not
entitled to assert sovereign immunity, we do not presently address this issue. Instead, we
limit our review to the specific question posed in the writ of certiorari." Id. at 35 n.1, 413
S.E.2d at 719 n.1. The question asked on certiorari was: "Does the existence of the liability
trust fund which protects the Hospital Authority of Fulton County result in a waiver of the
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bility Policy together with its self-insurance fund served to act as a
waiver of sovereign immunity.1s
In Hiers v. City of Barwick2 5 . the supreme court held unequivocally
that "the constitutional provision which waives immunity to the extent of
insurance applies to municipalities."125 3 Although the supreme court in
making this ruling did not mention the earlier court of appeals decision
Brockman v. Burnette,2 14 the ruling in Hiers was, in actuality, an affirmance and clarification of Brockman.255 The main issue the court dealt
with in Hiers, however, was whether the City's participation in the Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency ("GIRMA") constituted a waiver
of sovereign immunity. 5 6 Even though certain portions of the legislation
that authorizes GIRMA257 express an intent not to waive sovereign immunity,258 the court found those provisions to be in conflict with the Georgia

Constitution and, therefore, void.2 51 "The provision of liability insurance
authority's sovereign immunity, assuming that hospital authorities are entitled to such immunity?" Id. at 35, 413 S.E.2d at 719.
251. Id. at 36, 413 S.E.2d at 720.
252. 262 Ga. 129, 414 S.E.2d 647 (1992).
253. Id. at 131, 414 S.E.2d at 649 (footnote omitted). See GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9
(amended 1991).
254. 184 Ga. App. 66, 360 S.E.2d 655 (1987).
255. The holding in Brockman, although not as clear as the holding in Hiers, essentially
stated that
the 1983 constitutional provision is by its terms self-executing, and the Martin
decision clearly stands for the proposition that, as of the provision's effective date
in 1983, it results in an automatic waiver by a municipality of the defense of sovereign immunity to the extent of any applicable general liability insurance coverage carried by the municipality.
Id. at 67, 360 S.E.2d at 656. See also Martin v. Georgia Dep't of Pub. Safety, 257 Ga. 300,
357 S.E.2d 569 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 998 (1988).
The factual scenario in Hiers concerned a high-speed chase of a vehicle by the city's chief
of police. The chase ended ultimately in a collision involving plaintiffs' car (262 Ga. at 129,
414 S.E.2d at 648), but the court in Hiers did not discuss the implications, if any, that
O.C.G.A. § 36-33-3 (1987), might have on the holding discussed above. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-3
states that "[a] municipal corporation shall not be liable for the torts of policemen or other
officers engaged in the discharge of the duties imposed on them by law." O.C.G.A. § 36-33-3.
See also Peeples v. City of Atlanta, 189 Ga. App. 888, 377 S.E.2d 889 (1989).
256. 262 Ga. at 130; 414 S.E.2d at 648.
257. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-85-1 to -20 (1987 & supp. 1992).
258. Id. § 36-85-20 (1987).
259. 262 Ga. at 132, 414 S.E.2d at 649. In declaring this holding the court specifically
disapproved the earlier court of appeals decision in Adams v. Perdue, 199 Ga. App. 476, 405
S.E.2d 305 (1991) (defendant city's participation in GIRMA did not waive sovereign immunity). Although not specifically mentioned in Hiers, it is assumed that the. decision in
Sinkfield v. Pike, 201 Ga. App. 652, 411 S.E.2d 889 (1991), would also be disapproved to the
extent that it followed Adams.
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under GIRMA constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent
of available coverage. "260
The doctrine of family immunity continued its evolution2"' during this
survey period with the decision in Newsome v. Department of Human
Resources,212 which dealt specifically with the issue of parental immunity.2 6 In Newsome the natural parents of foster children brought a personal injury and wrongful death action against the children's foster parents. 2 ' Recognizing that parental immunity has been extended to foster
parents,2 s the court noted that at the time the parents filed the instant
suit, the children no longer lived with their foster parents.2 s The court
reviewed previous decisions concerning when the public policy reasons for
the grant of immunity were no longer viable2s7 and concluded that the
imposition of parental immunity would be determined by the status of
the parties' relationship at the time the action is filed, thereby reversing
the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant foster
2
parents.

0

F. Indemnity
The court of appeals in two cases decided this year, Allstate Insurance
Co. v. City of Atlanta2 69 and Moore v. Harry Norman, Inc.," * refused to
give effect to indemnity agreements signed by the parties.2 71 In Allstate
260. 262 Ga. at 132, 414 S.E.2d at 649. When insurance coverage is not present, in order
to determine municipal liability it is necessary to ascertain the governmental or ministerial
character of the particular conduct at issue. See O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(b) (1987); Sinkfield v.
Pike, 201 Ga. App. 652, 411 S.E.2d 889 (1991). During this survey period the following cases
were decided concerning the characterization of specific conduct involving municipal corporations: Banks v. Patton, 202 Ga. App. 168, 413 S.E.2d 744 (1991) (decision to rush to scene
of emergency in police vehicle was discretionary-governmental immunity applied);
Sinkfield v. Pike, 201 Ga. App. 652, 411 S.E.2d 889 (1991) (operation of fire truck en route
to fire is protected by governmental immunity).
261. See Adams & Adams, supra note 68, at 421; Cynthia T. Adams & Charles R. Adams
III, Torts, 41 MERCER L. REv. 355, 379 (1989).
262. 199 Ga. App. 419, 405 S.E.2d 61 (1991).
263. See generally GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 4, § 21-4.
264. 199 Ga. App. at 419, 405 S.E.2d at 62.
265. See Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316, 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986).
266. 199 Ga. App. at 421, 405 S.E.2d at 63.
267. See Harris v. Harris, 252 Ga. 387, 313 S.E.2d 88 (1984); Trust Co. Bank v. Thornton, 186 Ga. App. 706, 368 S.E.2d 158 (1988). See also Smith v. Rowell, 176 Ga. App. 100,
335 S.E.2d 461 (1985). But see Shoemake v. Shoemake, 200 Ga. App. 182, 407 S.E.2d 134
(1991).
268. 199 Ga. App. at 421-23, 405 S.E.2d at 63-64.
269. 202 Ga. App. 692, 415 S.E.2d 308 (1992).
270. 199 Ga. App. 233, 404 S.E.2d 793 (1991).
271. Id. at 236, 404 S.E.2d at 795.
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plaintiff's insurance company (Allstate) had signed an indemnity agreement with the City of Atlanta as a release for subrogation monies received as a result of plaintiff's collision with a City of Atlanta maintenance truck. ' Giving the necessary strict construction to this agreement
as one that attempted to indemnify the indemnitee against its own negli'
gence,27
the court found that:
[t]he indemnification language is bereft of any express or explicit statement about coverage for the city's own negligence, either direct or vicarious ....
It should have stated such coverage, if intended, with clarity
and specificity for it is insufficient to imply such coverage
from the cir274
cumstances of the incident giving rise to the agreement.

In Moore plaintiff homeowner in signing a sales listing agreement with
defendant realtor had agreed to hold defendant harmless from any claims
"which result from any negligent acts of persons who are employees of
[defendant], whenever said acts occur during the period of this listing."27
During the listing period plaintiff's home was burglarized when the lock
box containing her, house key was also burglarized. Plaintiff brought a
negligence action against defendants for failure to disclose the burglary
information and failure to prevent unauthorized access to her home2 76
and presented evidence that defendant had knowledge of a number of
previous lock box burglaries in the area, but had not passed this information on to its employee agents.2 77 Defendants claimed insulation from 1ia-

272. 202 Ga. App. at 692, 415 S.E.2d at 309.
273. In Georgia, in order for an indemnity agreement validly to idemnify an indemnitee
against its own negligence, the agreement must plainly and unequivocally so state in clear
and specific language. See generally Molly Pitcher Canning Co. v. Central Ry., 149 Ga. App.
5, 253 S.E.2d 392 (1979); Batson-Cook Co. v. Georgia Marble Setting Co., 112 Ga. App. 226,
144 S.E:2d 547 (1965).
274. 202 Ga. App. at 693-94, 415 S.E.2d at 310 (emphasis in original). The reader is
referred to the opinion for a full text of the pertinent parts of the indemnity agreement. Id.
at 692, 415 S.E.2d at 309.
Another public policy concern in dealing with indemnity agreements that indemnify the
indemnitee's own negligence is "to assure that people exercise due care in their activities for
fear of liability, rather than act carelessly in the knowledge that indemnity insurance will
relieve them." Id. at 693, 415 S.E.2d at 310. In this case, even though the event to be indemnified against had already occurred and the public policy against carelessness was thereby
mooted, the court specifically held that the language specificity requirement was still applicable. Id..at 693-94, 415 S.E.2d at 309-10. See supra note 273.
275. 199 Ga. App. at 236, 404 S.E.2d at 795.
276. Id. at 234, 404 S.E.2d at 794.
277. Id. at 234-35, 404 S.E.2d at 794-95. The real estate agent who dealt with plaintiff
had no knowledge of the other burglaries and, if fact, had told plaintiff that the only problem she had ever encountered with lock box use in 15 years of selling real estate was a
missing ashtray. Id. at 234, 404 S.E.2d at 794.
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bility based on the indemnity agreement.27 Even though the language in
this agreement specifically attempted to indemnify the indemnitee
against the negligence of its employees, the court found that since evidence showed that defendant "made a deliberate decision, through its
board of directors, to withhold information . . . concerning other 'lock
box burglaries' in the metropolitan Atlanta area[,] . . . the corporation's
alleged liability is predicated on its own official actions as a corporation
rather than on the negligence of individual employees "' 79 and, therefore,
refused to uphold the indemnity agreement.280
G. Limited Duty
The court in Turner v. Walker County2 81 had to determine the legality
of a signed release from liability in the performance of community service
work. Plaintiff's decedent was a probationer in Walker County, Georgia,
who, prior to beginning his court-imposed community service, had signed
a covenant not to sue for any injury received during the course of that
work. While performing community service work at the county landfill,
plaintiff's decedent was killed when the front-end loader he was operating
overturned on him.2 2 The court succinctly held that this release from
liability signed by the decedent established a complete defense to plaintiff's wrongful death claim against the county.2 8
IV.

A.

OTHER GROUNDS OF TORT LIABILITY

Products Liability

The "open and obvious" rule 84 and its corollary, the duty to warn,2 96
continue as a primary focus of Georgia product liability litigation. The
278. Id. at 236, 404 S.E.2d at 795.
279. Id.
280. Id., 404 S.E.2d at 796. In another case decided during this survey period, McPherson v. City of Ft. Oglethorpe, 200 Ga. App. 129, 407 S.E.2d 99 (1991), plaintiffs, alleging
negligent operation and maintenance of a traffic signal, argued that they were the direct
beneficiaries of an indemnity agreement between defendant city and the Department of
Transportation concerning the maintenance of the traffic signal. Id. at 130, 407 S.E.2d at
100. The court found no merit to this argument, stating that "[i]t is clear from the record
that the City neither agreed to undertake any responsibility regarding the maintenance of
the traffic signal nor undertook any such responsibility for which they could hold DOT
harmless." Id. at 131, 407 S.E.2d at 101.
281. 200 Ga. App. 565, 408 S.E.2d 818 (1991).
282. Id. at 565, 408 S.E.2d at 819.
283., Id.
284. For a more complete discussion of the "open and obvious" rule, see Adams & Adams, supra note 68, at 422-23.
285. For a discussion of the duty to warn, see GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 4, § 25-3.
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parties' status may have a bearing on the duty to warn, ' " as Brown v.
Apollo Industries, Inc.2 87 illustrates. Plaintiff's decedent in Brown died
because of severe electrical burns he received while using in a high voltage area an aerosol cleaning spray manufactured by defendant.
"[D]ecedeht was an experienced technician and familiar with the procedures to be followed in the job he was performing, having performed similar procedures 25 to 30 times in the past, and he knew or should have
known not to use an aerosol spray inside the compartment he was cleaning.'' ss Thus, defendant breached no duty to warn plaintiff.
Not only the parties' status, but also their relation to each other, affects
the duty to warn, as the court held in Dupree v. Keller Industries,Inc."'
Plaintiffs in that case were operators of a press their employer had purchased from defendant. When the press injured plaintiffs, they sued defendant on theories that defendant failed to add safeguard devices to conform the press to industry and to OSHA standards, and also that
defendant owed them a common-law duty to warn.2 9
The court disposed of the first part of plaintiffs' claim by holding that
whatever duties OSHA or industry standards created for defendant, it
did not owe those duties to plaintiffs as "remote users" of the product."'
Regarding the common-law duty to warn, the court recognized Georgia's
adoption 292 of sections 388 and 389 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,' but found those provisions inapplicable to the instant case.'
"[T]here was a complete absence of evidence that [defendant] had reason
to believe that [plaintiffs or their employer] would not realize the lack of
the safeguard devices."'2 5 Under those circumstances, defendant had no
duty to plaintiffs and could not be liable either for failing to install the
safeguard devices or to warn of their absence.2 9
286. See Dupree v.Keller Indus., Inc., 199 Ga. App. 138, 143, 404 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991).
287. 199 Ga. App. 260, 404 S.E.2d 447 (1991).
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 263, 404 S.E.2d at 450.
199 Ga. App. 138, 404 S.E.2d 291 (1991).
Id. at 139, 404 S.E.2d at 293.
Id. at 142, 404 S.E.2d at 295.
See Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga. App. 456, 459-61, 46 S.E.2d 197, 199-200

292.
(1948).
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 388 (1965) deals with liability of suppliers of
chattels known to be dangerous for intended use. Section 389 deals with liability of suppliers of chattels unlikely to be made safe for use. Id. § 389. See 199 Ga. App. at 143, 404
S.E.2d at 295.
294. 199 Ga. App. at 143, 404 S.E.2d at 295-96.
295. Id., 404 S.E.2d at 296.
296. Id.
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B. Nuisance
"While a municipality is not liable for negligence in the exercise of a
governmental function, it may be liable for injury resulting from the
maintenance of a nuisance regardless of whether it arises from the exercise of a governmental or a ministerial function."" 7 For this reason, nuisance is an attractive alternative, and frequently the only alternative, for
imposing liability on a local government.298 In Denson v. City of Atlanta 29 9 the en banc court of appeals reiterated the three-part test for
municipal nuisance liability:
"(1) The defect or degree of misfeasance must ...exceed the concept of
mere negligence. (A single isolated act of negligence is not sufficient
....) (2) The act must be of some duration ... and the maintenance of

the act or defect must be continuous or regularly repetitious[.] (3) [T]he
municipality [must fail] to act within a reasonable time after knowledge
of the defect or dangerous condition." 00
Plaintiffs in Denson lost, however, because the problem with the city's
traffic lights that caused their collision had not been in existence long
that such operation of the sigenough to have "placed the city on notice
30
nals constituted a dangerous condition."1 1
The Home of the Braves was not so fortunate in Grier v. City of Atlanta."' Since 1910, Atlanta had maintained Maddox Park on either side
of a railroad track, and children had long played on or near the trains
that ran through the park. Plaintiff's minor child lost his leg when, after
climbing aboard a train to cross from one side of the park to the other, he
attempted to jump from the moving cars. 03 Finding a jury question, the
court held that the length of time trains had run through the park and
the number of children observed playing on the trains30evidenced a "continuous or regularly repetitious" dangerous condition. '
297. Denson v. City of Atlanta, 202 Ga. App. 325, 327, 414 S.E.2d 312, 314 (1991).
298. Counties can also be liable for maintaining a nuisance. See Provost v. Gwinnett
County, 199 Ga. App, 713, 405 S.E.2d 754 (1991).
299. 202 Ga. App. 325, 414 S.E.2d 312 (1991) (en banc).
300. Id. at 327, 414 S.E.2d at 314 (quoting City of Bowman v. Gunnells, 243 Ga. 809,

811, 256 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1979)).
301. Id., 414 S.E.2d at 315.
302. 200 Ga. App. 575, 408 S.E.2d 794 (1991).

303. Id. at 575-76, 408 S.E.2d at 795-96.
304. Id. at 576, 408 S.E.2d at 796.

TORTS
C. Defamation
Georgia law holds a corporation vicariously liable for libel but not for
slander.305 This dichotomy, criticized in last year's torts survey,0 6 continued during the survey period in Gantt v. Patient Communications Systems. 0 " In Gantt defendant's employees made verbal and written defamatory statements about plaintiff. Although the employees made all of the
statements in the course of their employment, no evidence showed defendant "expressly directed" them to do so.30 Thus, applying the curiously inconsistent rule stated above, plaintiff had a jury claim for libel,
but not for slander.30 9
Although expressions of opinion are frequently protected from defamation claims, 10 "[tjhere is no 'wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled "opinion." [To say otherwise would] ignore
the fact that expressions of "opinion" may often imply an assertion of
objective fact.' """'In Eidson v.Berry,31 2' defendant wrote a letter to the
editor, in which he accused plaintiff, the city attorney, of "knowingly violat[ing] Federal law" by "illegally" tape recording a private conversation
between city officials.113 Even conceding that plaintiff was a public figure
who could only recover on proof of actual malice, 4 the court concluded
that defendant's complete lack of evidence to support his accusations "is
sufficient to authorize any reasonable jury's finding that defendant...
acted with reckless disregard for the-truth . . . . ,
D. Mental Abuse
In General. The tragedy of Lizzie Borden, referred to in the introduction to this article,"1 illustrates one remedy people may seek when denied
305. See Adams & Adams, supra note 68, at 427.
306. Id. at 427-28.
307. 200 Ga. App. 35, 406 S.E.2d 796 (1991).
308. Id. at 39, 406 S.E.2d at 800.
309. Id. Cf. Lepard v. Robb, 201. Ga. App. 41, 410 S.E.2d 160 (1991) (corporate libel and
slander alleged; slander claim denied for lack of vicarious liability; libel claim denied because no publication).
310. See ADAMS & ADAMS, supra note 4, § 28-6 (Supp. 1992).
311. Eidson v. Berry, 202 Ga. App. 587, 587, 415 S.E.2d 16, 17 (1992) (quoting Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705 (1991)).
312. 202 Ga. App. 587, 415 S.E.2d 16 (1992).
313. Id. at 587, 415 S.E.2d at 17.
314. See Shannon v.Rado, 200 Ga. App. 495, 408 S.E.2d 441 (1991) (test for determining
public figure status stated).
315. 202 Ga. App. at 589, 415 S.E.2d at 18. For a good discussion of the law in this area
in the context of a*similar factual setting, see Good Government Group, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 586 P.2d 572 (Cal. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
316. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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any other outlet for mental abuses inflicted on them.""7 The law until
fairly recently reflected the attitude contained in the following statement
from a famous law review article: "Against a large part of the frictions
and irritations and clashing of temperaments incidental to participation
in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is better
protection than the law could ever be." ' Although this approach is not
without practical appeal, to the victims of the very real damages visited
by mental abuse, it must seem somewhat akin to the argument that Lizzie
Borden deserved sympathy because she was an orphan!8 19 Although the
law has only recently and grudgingly3 20 come to recognize the genuine
damage sustained when a plaintiff's peace, happiness, or well-being is injured, the cases arising out of such injuries occupy an ever-increasing
amount of judicial resources. The survey period was no exception, as the
following representative selections indicate.
Infliction of Emotional Distress. During the survey period, the
courts decided several cases of seminal importance regarding the controversial tort of infliction of emotional distress. In Yarbray v. Southern
Bell, 2s the supreme court disagreed with both the trial court and the
court of appeals8 22 about the viability of plaintiff's emotional distress
claim. Yarbray testified against Southern Bell in another employee's discrimination suit.82 8 She claimed Southern Bell "threatened that she

would lose her job if she testified against the company, and, after she
testified, retaliated by transferring her to an unsatisfactory employment
situation.8' 24 The court reiterated that the conduct complained of must
have been both "extreme and outrageous" and "severe," 2 5 but held that
the determination whether conduct rises to that level is a question of law
in the first instance.2 6 The allegations that Southern Bell "deliberately
317. U.S. News & World Report, supra note 2, suggests that Miss Borden may have
been the victim of sexual abuse. This would account for the particularly brutal nature of the
murders.
318. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REv. 1033, 1035 (1936).
319. See Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1020 (1989).
320. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRossER & KEE'ON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 5455 (5th ed. 1984).
321. 261 Ga. 703, 409 S.E.2d 835 (1991).
322. See Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 197 Ga. App. 846, 399 S.E.2d 718
(1990), rev'd in part, 261 Ga. 703, 409 S.E.2d 835 (1991).
323. 197 Ga. App. at 847, 399 S.E.2d at 720.
324. 261 Ga. at 704, 409 S.E.2d at 836.
325. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 837 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965)).
326. Id. at 707, 409 S.E.2d at 838 (citing Gordon v. Frost, 193 Ga. App. 517, 521, 388
S.E.2d 362, 366 (1989)).

19921

TORTS

409

set out to retaliate against" plaintiff, "to punish her for ignoring its lawyer's admonitions and testifying against" Southern Bell, and its "subjecting [plaintiff] to abuse by her supervisor and causing her severe emotional pain," if proved, would meet the legal test of outrageousness and
present a jury question. 2 '
An unspoken premise for the holding in Yarbray was the nature of the
parties' relationship. The court of appeals made this explicit in the only
other two survey period emotional distress cases that resulted in
favorable outcomes for the plaintiff. Both of these concerned medical
providers. In Williams v. Voljavec, ss82 defendant doctor "cussed out"
plaintiff, his patient, over an insurance claim form.3' In Wideman v.
defendant Emergency Medical Technicians'
DeKalb County,38s
("EMT's") refused to take plaintiff to her own hospital and doctor when
she was having a miscarriage. Defendants instead fabricated an emergency loss of blood to justify taking plaintiff to their hospital. 8 "A defendant's knowledge of a plaintiff's particular susceptibility to injury
from emotional distress is often critical in weighing the extreme and outrageous character of [the] conduct," 8 2 said the court in Williams. "The
conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor
proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did
not know," ' added the court in Wideman. Thus, in both of these cases,
the relationship of trust and dependency that the plaintiffs had in the
defendants added to the outrageous nature of defendants' conduct and
84
presented an issue for jury resolution.
In a "startling reassessment" 3 '1of the basis for an infliction of emotional distress claim, the supreme court in the 1989 case of OB-GYN Associates v. Littleton 33 narrowed the long-standing "impact rule '8 7 gov-

327. Id. at 706, 409 S.E.2d at 838.
328. 202 Ga. App. 580, 415 S.E.2d 31 (1992).
329. See id. at 581, 415 S.E.2d at 33.
330. 200 Ga. App. 624, 409 S.E.2d 537 (1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 262 Ga. 210, 416 S.E.2d 498 (1992).
331. 200 Ga. App. at 625, 409 S.E.2d at 540.
332. 202 Ga. App. at 582, 415 S.E.2d at 33.'
333. 200 Ga. App. at 627, 409 S.E.2d at 542 (quoting Gordon v. Frost, 193 Ga. App. 517,
521, 388 S.E.2d 362, 366 (1989)).
334. The court in Brown v. Manning, 764 F. Supp. 183 (M.D. Ga. 1991), also applied
Gordon to find a jury question on infliction of emotional distress arising out of the special
relationship between an insurance adjuster and the insured. The facts of that case are not
for the dainty or easily offended. See id. at 184-86 ("The court apologizes for the vulgarity
of the language recounted infra.").
335. Adams & Adams, supra note 123, at 459.
336. 259 Ga. 663, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989).
337. The "impact rule" had held that any unlawful touching that resulted in emotional
distress was actionable, even if no physical injury was involved. See Christy Bros. Circus v.

410

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

erning such torts and held that, when the emotional distress claim is
premised only on negligent conduct, the plaintiff must suffer either an
actual physical injury or a pecuniary loss arising out of a nonphysical personal injury.3 8 Littleton was back in the appellate courts during the survey period on the issue of whether plaintiff, whose baby died allegedly as
a result of defendants' negligence 8 39 had suffered an "actionable physical
injury""' that would support recovery of damages for emotional distress.
Holding that she had, the court emphasized that "any potential award of
damages. . . is limited to compensation for any physical injury [plaintiff]
suffered as a result of the alleged negligence, and any mental suffering or
emotional distress she incurred as a consequence of her physical
84 1
injuries.

42
Invasion of Privacy. In the leading case of Cabaniss v. Hipsley,3
the court recognized that "invasion of privacy" consists of four loosely
related torts. 43 In an unusual occurrence, all four were represented in
this survey period's cases.
The notorious affair between Donald Trump and Marla Maples 4
spawned federal litigation in Georgia. Among the issues in Maples v. National Enquirer,84 ' an action by Miss Maples' father arising out of a
spurious "interview" of plaintiff in defendant's supermarket tabloid, was
whether defendant's report of false information in the form of such an
"interview" constituted commercial appropriation of plaintiff's name and
likeness.146 Defendant argued that Georgia law limited plaintiff's recovery
to unauthorized use of his name or likeness in commercial advertisements
or product endorsements. The district court, however, "[did] not agree

Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928), overruled by 259 Ga. 663, 386 S.E.2d 146

(1989).
338. 259 Ga. at 666-67, 386 S.E.2d at 149. See also Ryckeley v. Callaway, 261 Ga. 828,
828, 412 S.E.2d 826, 826 (1992); Dillman v. Kahres, 201 Ga. App. 210, 211, 411 S.E.2d 43, 44
(1991) (conduct must be directed toward plaintiff); Broadfoot v. Aaron Rents, Inc., 200 Ga.
App. 755, 758, 409 S.E.2d 870, 874 (1991) (damage to personal property does not authorize
recovery for mental suffering).
339. See Littleton v. OB-GYN Assocs., 199 Ga. App. 44, 403 S.E.2d 837, aff'd, 261 Ga.
664, 410 S.E.2d 121 (1991).
340. 199 Ga. App. at 45, 403 S.E.2d at 838.
341. Id. at 46 n.1, 403 S.E.2d at 840 n.1. The supreme court was at pains to point out
that this "clearly and correctly states the rule." 261 Ga. at 664, 410 S.E.2d at 122.
342. 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496 (1966). See generally GEORGIA TORTS, supra note
4, § 29-3.
343. 114 Ga. App. at 370, 151 S.E.2d at 500.
344. See, e.g., Best Sex I Ever Had!, N.Y. POST, Feb. 16, 1990, at Al.
345. 763 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
346. Id. at 1143.
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that commercial appropriation under Georgia law is so limited. 's 7 Because defendant featured' plaintiff's name and story prominently on the
cover of its publication, "in a very real sense, Plaintiff's likeness and story
could be considered used by Defendant as publicity or advertising for Defendant's publication itself."' 48
Plaintiff also asserted another theory of privacy recovery. Arguing that
anyone who knew the true facts of his daughter's relationship with
Trump would consider plaintiff a liar based on the statements defendant
attributed to him,"" plaintiff contended the publication placed him in a
false light in the public eye.350 Applying the rule that the false statement
must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person if shown in the same
light,""5 ' the court concluded that a statement which makes a plaintiff
out to be a "self-confessed liar" 52 is actionable as a matter of law under a
false light invasion of privacy theory.
Closely related to the false light privacy invasion is the public disclosure of embarrassing or private facts.8 53 The supreme court rejected an
attempt to use this defensively in Dortch v.Atlanta Journal & Atlanta
3 54
Constitution,
holding that the Georgia Open Records Act 35 required

the disclosure of certain telephone numbers called from cellular telephones owned by the City of Atlanta.3 1" Like Maples, the court emphasized that "(the matter made public must be offensive and objectionable
3 7
to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities under the circumstances)"
and concluded that "such disclosure would [not] be so offensive or objec347.
348.

Id.
Id.

349. It would too far trespass upon the dignity of the Mercer Law Review to recount
these statements here. They are quoted in the district court's order, and in essence convey
that Miss Maples was the "mistress" of Trump, who "dumped" her "like a sack of rotten
potatoes," plunging her into a "black depression" and leaving her "close to suicide." Id. at
1139. Plaintiff is quoted as being "mad as hell. . . land] ready to march into Donald's office
and punch him in the nose!" Id. Cf. supra note 344.
350. See generally GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 4, § 29-3, at 344-45.
351. 763 F. Supp. at 1141 (quoting Annotation, False Light-Elements, 57 A.L.R. 4th 22,
161 (1987)). This is also the Georgia rule. See Thomason v. Times-Journal, Inc., 190 Ga.
App. 601, 604, 379 S.E.2d 551, 554 (1989).
352. 763 F. Supp. at 1142 (quoting Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190,
221, 50 S.E. 68, 81 (1904)).
353. The two theories are chiefly distinguished by the availability of the defense of truth
for the former but not the latter. See GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 4, § 29-3, at 343-45.
354. 261 Ga. 350, 405 S.E.2d 43 (1991).
355. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -75 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
356. 261 Ga. at 252, 405 S.E.2d at 45.
357. Id. (quoting Cabaniss, 114 Ga. App. 367, 372, 151 S.E.2d 496, 501)).
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tionable to a reasonable man as to constitute the tort of invasion of
36 6
privacy."
In Yarbray v. Southern Bell,3 59 discussed above, 80 the supreme court
rejected plaintiff's claim that Southern Bell intruded upon her seclusion
or solitude and the privacy of her affairs.3"' This theory of invasion of
privacy is akin to the public disclosure theory at issue in Dortch, with the
omission of the publication element. 8 2 It does, however, require intrusion
in a manner that would be offensive to a reasonable person.63 "The pro-,
tection afforded by the law to the right of privacy. . . must be restricted
to 'ordinary sensibilities' and not to supersensitiveness or agoraphobia. 3 6 4 Thus, the court in Yarbray held it was not an unreasonable invasion of plaintiff's privacy to warn her of the company's concerns about
38 5
her testimony.
False Imprisonment. The detention necessary to support a claim for
false imprisonment "need not consist of physical restraint, but may arise
out of 'words, acts, gestures, or the like, which induce a reasonable apprehension that force will be used if plaintiff does not submit; and it is sufficient if they operate upon the will of the person threatened, and result in
reasonable fear of personal difficulty or personal injuries.'"366 This "reasonable fear of personal difficulty" sustained a claim for false imprisonment in Wideman v. DeKalb County,3 6 7 discussed above."6 In Wideman
plaintiff's need for immediate medical care, her lack of other means of
transportation to the hospital, and the refusal of defendant EMT's to deliver her to the hospital of her choice, presented a jury issue, albeit a close
3 9
one, on her fear of personal difficulty.

6

Malicious Prosecution. In a highly questionable four-to-three decision, the supreme court in K-Mart Corp. v. Coker170 reversed the court of
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id.
261
See
See
See
See

Ga. 703, 409 S.E.2d 835 (1991).
supra notes 321-27 and accompanying text.
261 Ga. at 704-05, 409 S.E.2d at 836-37.
GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 4, § 29-3, at 342-44.
261 Ga. at 705, 409 S.E.2d at 837.
364. GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 4, § 29-3, at 343.
365. 261 Ga. at 705, 409 S.E.2d at 837.,
366. Fields v. Kroger Co., 202 Ga. App. 475, 475, 414 S.E.2d 703, 704-05 (1992) (quoting
Seligman & Latz, Inc. v. Grant, 116 Ga. App. 539, 540, 158 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1967)).
367. 200 Ga. App. 624, 409 S.E.2d 537 (1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 262 Ga. 210, 416 S.E.2d 498 (1992).
368. See supra notes 330-33 and accompanying text.
369. 200 Ga. App. at 629, 409 S.E.2d at 543.
370. 261 Ga. 745, 410 S.E.2d 425 (1991).
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appeals decision discussed in last year's torts survey 37 1 and determined
that defendant had probable cause for its treatment of plaintiff.37 The
majority held that plaintiff's discarding a lipstick she had not paid for
before leaving defendant's store was sufficient evidence of criminal intent
to justify her arrest and subsequent prosecution for shoplifting.373,
The court in Coker, however, in attempting to relieve shopkeepers from
the necessity of determining a shopper's subjective intent, went too far by
effectively relieving them also from the duty of making a reasonable inquiry about the circumstances. As the dissent pointed out, a line of Georgia appellate decisions dating back to 1887311 requires that a reasonable
and proper inquiry be made before a criminal prosecution is instituted or
maintained.37 5 In Coker it was undisputed that defendant's employee
never asked plaintiff why she discarded the lipstick before leaving the
store;370 indeed, as the dissent observed, the evidence justified a conclusion that "defendant made no inquiry, much less a 'due and proper inquiry.' "
The result in Coker, therefore, seems out of balance with the
legal requirement that "[flack of probable cause shall be a question for
the jury, under the direction of the court. 3 178 A more balanced treatment
of this issue is found in Bi-Lo, Inc. v. McConnell.378 In that case, defendant prosecuted plaintiff, its employee, for shoplifting a damaged can of
soft drink. Plaintiff, seventeen years old and with no criminal record, had
seen other employees consume damaged soft drinks and thought such
drinks were thrown out. Upon discovering plaintiff with the drink, defendant's manager immediately called the police and refused to allow
plaintiff to call his parents."
Sustaining a thirty-thousand dollar jury verdict for plaintiff, the court
of appeals focused on the necessity for defendant to make a reasonable
inquiry into the circumstances. 8 "[E]ven the most cursory investigation"
38
would have revealed plaintiff's lack of criminal intent, said the court. 2
371. See Coker v. K-Mart Corp., 197 Ga. App. 701, 399 S.E.2d 249 (1990), rev'd, 261 Ga.
745, 410 S.E.2d 425'(1991). The court of appeals decision is discussed in Adams & Adams,
supra note 68, at 432.
372. 261 Ga. at 747, 410 S.E.2d at 427.
373. Id.
374. See, e.g., Coleman v. Allen, 79 Ga. 637, 640-41, 5 S.E. 204, 206 (1887); Melton v.
LaCalamito, 158 Ga. App. 820, 824, 282 S.E.2d 393, 398 (1981).
375. See 261 Ga. at 750, 410 S.E.2d at 429-30 (Smith, P.J., dissenting).
376. Id. at 754, 410 S.E.2d at 431.
377. Id. at 752, 410 S.E.2d at 430 (quoting Coleman, 79 Ga. at 641, 5 S.E. at 204).
378. O.C.G.A. § 51-7-43 (1982).
379. 199 Ga. App. 154, 404 S.E.2d 327 (1991).
380. Id. at 155, 404 S.E.2d at 328.
381. Id. at 156, 404 S.E.2d at 329.
382. Id.
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When "'slight diligence would have brought to [defendant's] attention
facts which would have shown conclusively that there could be no conviction, whether or not [defendant] is guilty of malicious prosecution is a
question of. fact to be determined by a jury.' "3813 McConnell represents a
better-reasoned legal view, and it remains to be seen whether the supreme court's decision in Coker represents a shift away from these established jurisprudential principles, or a one-time factual abberation.
Abusive Litigation. The appellate courts have begun to flesh out the
provisions of Georgia's abusive litigation statute.3 84 Significantly, in Patterson u. Cox Enterprises,Inc. ,38 the court limited the reach of this statute to conduct arising out of "civil proceedings" in law or equity.38 ' Thus,
the statute does not apply to conduct arising out of proceedings under the
Workers' Compensation Act, which are administrative in nature.3 87 Although "the appeal to the supdrior court . .. brings the case into the
judicial arena . . . [t]he appeal is not a civil proceeding within the scope

of the abusive litigation statute but rather a review upon the record made
in the administrative agency .

.

. ,,88 The court based its conclusion on

the express terms of the statute. 389 The conclusion is also consonant with
the common-law decisions, which hold, for example, that criminal proceedings389 and nonjudicial foreclosures 3 1' cannot give rise to abusive litigation claims.
Because the abusive litigation statute is the exclusive remedy for claims
filed on and after April 3, 1989,389 we may expect abusive litigation decisions arising out of the judicially-created abusive litigation tort first
383. Id., 404 S.E.2d at 328 (quoting Voliton v. Piggly Wiggly, 161 Ga. App. 813, 814, 288
S.E.2d 924, 926 (1982)).
384. See O.C.G.A. §§ 51-7-80 to -85 (Supp. 1992). In Talbert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 200 Ga.
App. 312, 408 S.E.2d 125 (1991), the court affirmed dismissal of an abusive litigation claim
against Allstate for failure to give the notice required by O.C.G.A. § 51-7-84(a) (Supp. 1992)
directly to Allstate instead of to the attorney for its insured in the underlying case. Id. at
314, 408 S.E.2d at 127. The court, however, held the claim against Allstate was not barred
by the fact that Allstate was not a party to the original litigation. Id. at 313, 408 S.E.2d at
126. "It took an active part in the continuation of the proceedings and thus could be named
as defendant in an abusive litigation claim." Id.
385. 201 Ga. App. 222, 411 S.E.2d 85 (1991).
386. See O.C.G.A. § 51-7-80(1) (Supp. 1992).
387. See id. § 34-9-105 (1992).
388. 201 Ga. App. at 223, 411 S.E.2d at 86.
389. "Any person who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or procurement of civil proceedings against another shall be liable for abusive litigation ....
O.C.G.A. § 51-7-81 (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
390. See, e.g., Gillilan v. Still, 199 Ga. App. 118, 404 S.E.2d 445 (1991).
391. See, e.g., Ingram v. JIK Realty Co., 199 Ga. App. 335, 338, 404 S.E.2d 802, 805
(1991).
392. See O.C.G.A. § 51-7-85 (Supp. 1992).
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enunciated in Yost v. Torok"' gradually to disappear. At the present
time, however, they remain important, primarily for the judicial gloss
they provide regarding what constitutes abusive litigation. For example,
the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment generally con*stitutes a binding determination that the respondent's position was not
frivolous or groundless."" 4 Of course, courts may decline to apply this rule
in unusual cases, 39 5 as when the summary judgment motion was only on
procedural matters and not directed at the claim's merits.8s " Likewise, an
order denying an interlocutory injunction that does not amount to a consideration of the merits does not preclude a later abusive litigation claim
97
as a matter of law.3
E. Fraud
For a tort claim based on fraud, courts will deny relief to one who fails
to exercise reasonable diligence to protect himself and who relies upon
the representations of others for matters about which he could have informed himself. 98 As pointed out in Tower Financial Services, Inc. v.
Jarrett,39 however, "the burden on a fraud claimant to protect himself
by investigating the facts before proceeding with a transaction tends to
diminish in proportion to the egregiousness of the alleged fraud."' 00 The
court of appeals ruled that the jury was authorized to conclude that such
fraudulent representation had occurred in Hahne v. Wylly. 01 In that
case, defendant constructed a swimming pool in plaintiff's backyard and
assured plaintiff that the pool construction would pose no problem for the
operation of her septic tank. The evidence further indicated that defendant had removed a portion of the septic tank's drainage pipes during the
pool construction, but assured plaintiff that the removal would not affect
the tank. Plaintiff later experienced major problems with her septic tank
that were attributable to the pool's construction and the drainage pipe
removal. " 2 The court held that from this evidence the jury was author393. 256 Ga. 92, 344 S.E.2d 414 (1986).
394. See, e.g., Watkins v. M & M Clays, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 54, 57, 404 S.E.2d 141, 144
(1991).
395. See Felker v. Fenlason, 201 Ga. App. 207, 410 S.E.2d 326 (1991).
396. See, e.g., Ansa Mufflers Corp. v. Worthington, 201 Ga. App. 602, 603, 411 S.E.2d
573, 575 (1991).
397. Ingram v. JIK Realty Co., 199 Ga. App. 335, 338, 404 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1991).
398. See Browning v. Richardson, 181 Ga. 413, 182 S.E. 516 (1935); Webb v. Rushing,
194 Ga. App. 732, 391 S.E.2d 709 (1990); Thompson v. Pate, 193 Ga. App. 418, 388,S.E.2d
30 (1989).
399. 199 Ga. App. 248, 404 S.E.2d 622 (1991).
400. Id. at 250, 404 S.E.2d at 624-25.
401. 199 Ga. App. 811, 406 S.E.2d 94 (1991).
402. Id. at 811-12, 406 S.E.2d at 95-96.
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ized to find that defendant; who had special knowledge of pool construction, had made fraudulent403statements to plaintiff in the course of constructing the pool for her.
Likewise, in an action for fraud the injured party must have justifiably
relied upon the defendant's representations. 40 4 In Jones v. Ward,'40 plaintiff claimed reliance upon a Department of Family and Children's Services employee's alleged representation that she would intercede to prevent plaintiffs eviction from his home. 406 The court noted that according
to the Department's own regulations a case worker could not take any
action in an eviction proceeding, but could only process applications for
assistance',
Therefore, the court found that "[e]ven assuming the
promises were made . . . [plaintiff] was not entitled to rely on such

promises as they were beyond the powers conferred upon [the
caseworker] .
,,0 The court in Hardage v.Lewis'40 thwarted plain".4..
tiffs' fraud action against defendants concerning an allegedly negligent
survey"0 by a finding of no reliance on the representations of the survey.
Plaintiffs, after being informed by the sellers prior to closing that a portion of the backyard property "might be taken by the Department of
Transportation .. ,,4' did nothing to ascertain the existence of the Department's recorded easement. The court found that plaintiffs "clearlydid not rely [on the survey] to determine the truth or falsity of the sellers' representations"' 42 and could not, after the fact, seek to blame the
survey for their own lack of diligence
in determining the Department's
3
easement over their property."
403. Id. at 813, 406 S.E.2d at 97. In two other cases decided during this survey period
the court of appeals determined that plaintiffs failed to use due diligence to discover the
alleged fraud. Lester v. Bird, 200 Ga. App. 335, 408 S.E.2d 142 (1991) (plaintiffs' failure to
inspect crawl space of house before purchase at auction, which would have revealed termite
and other damage, exhibited lack of due diligence and barred recovery); Metmor Fin., Inc. v.
Jenkins, 199 Ga. App. 885, 406 S.E.2d 288 (1991) (plaintiff did not use due diligence by
failing to inspect the real estate for obvious construction deficiencies before he purchased
it).
404. See Alpha Kappa Psi Bldg. Corp. v. Kennedy, 90 Ga. App. 587, 83 S.E.2d 580
(1954); Bennett v. Clark, 192 Ga. App. 698, 385 S.E.2d 780 (1989).
405. 201 Ga. App. 757, 412 S.E.2d 576 (1991).
406. Id.at 758, 412 S.E.2d at 577.
407. Id. at 759, 412 S.E.2d at 578.
408. Id. at 760, 412 S.E.2d at 578.
409. 199 Ga. App. 632, 405 S.E.2d 732 (1991).
410. Plaintiffs' lender had hired defendants to prepare a survey of the property. The
survey did not show the easement held by the Department of Transportation, but plaintiffs
were not aware of the survey until the time of the closing. Id. at 632, 405 S.E.2d at 733.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 634, 405 S.E.2d at 734.
413. Id. "Appellants were damaged by their own reliance upon the sellers' representations and they have no viable claim against [defendants] simply because [defendants'] sur-
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Finally, a party may be relieved from the requirement of justifiable reliance when a confidential relationship exists between the parties that, by
law, supplies the element of "justification" to the transaction. 14 In the
case of Tigner v. Shearson-Lehman Hutton, Inc.,41 5 defendants allegedly
mismanaged plaintiff's funds, resulting in a loss of over. one million dollars to plaintiff. Plaintiff had received his initial funds from a 1982 personal injury damage award. Plaintiff could not read and suffered mental
deficiencies as a result of his previous injuries. Defendants were aware of
plaintiff's particular handicaps and agreed to manage his funds. Plaintiff
alleged that defendants had failed to inform him that the agreements he
had signed with them provided for compulsory arbitration. 416 The trial
court granted defendants' motion to compel arbitration," 7 but the court
of appeals reversed based on the trial court's failure to consider the confidential relationship that existed between plaintiff and defendants as a
result of plaintiff's disabilities of which defendants were fully aware.4 8
V.

DAMAGES

As in past years, the issue of punitive damages has, again, dominated
damages litigation.419 The supreme court in Bagley v. Shortt 42' had to
determine the constitutionality of the statutory punitive damages capping
provision4 2 ' and how this provision should be applied in a multiparty lawsuit. Succinctly finding this subsection to be constitutional, 2 2 the court
referred to the previously decided case of Teasley v. Mathis.42 3 In Teasley the court held that punitive damages could be statutorily eliminated
vey for the lender did not make the consequences of their own prior lack of diligence manifest at the closing." Id.
414. See Dover v. Burns, 186 Ga. 19, 196 S.E. 785 (1938); Arnall, Golden & Gregory v.
Health Serv. Centers, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 791, 399 S.E.2d 565 (1990).
415. 201 Ga. App. 713, 411 S.E.2d 800 (1991).
416. Id. at 713:14, 411 S.E.2d at 800-01.
417. In granting this motion, the trial court specifically found that plaintiff's mental deficiencies did not excuse his failure to ascertain the contents of the contracts he had signed
with defendants. Id. Compare Gardiner v. McDaniel, 202 Ga. App. 663, 415 S.E.2d 303
(1992) (plaintiff, who was laboring under no disabilities, was bound to exercise ordinary
diligence to read and to verify contents of promissory note he signed with defendant).
418. 201 Ga. App. at 716, 411 S.E.2d at 802.
419. See, e.g., Adams & Adams, supra note 68, at 437-38.
420. 261 Ga. 762, 410 S.E.2d 738 (1991).
421. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(g) (Supp. 1992). This statute provides that "[flor any tort action ... in which the trier of fact has determined that punitive damages are to be awarded,
the amount which may be awarded in the case shall be limited to a maximum of
$250,000.00." Id.
422. 261 Ga. at 762, 410 S.E.2d at 739.
423. 243 Ga. 561, 255 S.E.2d 57 (1979).
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entirely;'" therefore, in the present context no constitutional impediment
existed for statutorily circumscribing such damages as set forth in section
51-12-5.1(g). 2 The court then turned to the question of the interpretation of the statutory provision that "the amount which may be awarded
in the case shall be limited to a maximum of $250,000.00. ''12 After noting
that this language was somewhat ambiguous as written,'427 particularly in
the context of multiparty litigation, the court held that the $250,000.00
cap:
means that $250,000.00 is the maximum amount of money that the finder
of fact may award to any one plaintiff as punitive damages-regardless
of the number of defendants and regardless of the number of theories of
recovery "arising out of the 2same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences."'

The court in Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Boswell 2 1 further limited the scope of punitive damages by reversing a judgment from the court of appeals " and holding that MARTA was not subject to the imposition of punitive damages.'' Although the majority held
that punitive damage awards against MARTA "would seriously damage
the public interest,'4 2 Presiding Justice Smith, as the sole dissenter and
424. Id. at 564, 255 S.E.2d at 58.
425. 261 Ga. at 762, 410 S.E.2d at 739.
426. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(g).
427. 261 Ga. at 763 n.3, 410 S.E.2d at 739 n.3.
428. Id. The more prevalent question the courts are asked to determine is whether the
evidence of a defendant's conduct in a particular situation is egregious enough to warrant
the imposition of punitive damages, and this survey period was not lacking in such cases.
See, e.g., Miles Rich Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Mass, 201 Ga. App. 693, 411 S.E.2d 901
(1991) (evidence of actual fraud and intentional violation of Georgia Fair Business Practices
Act could support award of punitive damages); Cullen v. Novak, 201 Ga. App. 459, 411
S.E.2d 331 (1991) (evidence that defendant merely negligently ran red light could not support punitive damages award); Morales v. Webb, 200 Ga. App. 788, 409 S.E.2d 572 (1991)
(punitive damage award not supported because lack of evidence showing actual knowledge
of shortage of anesthesia); Georgia Kraft Co. v. Faust, 200 Ga. App. 686, 409 S.E.2d 247
(1991) (evidence that defendant's employees exercised little or no care to prevent damage to
his trailer in their attempts to retrieve a forklift would support punitive damages award);
Day v. Burnett, 199 Ga. App. 494, 405 S.E.2d 316 (1991) (evidence that defendant when
involved in automobile collision was under the influence of alcohol, was travelling at an
excessive speed, was following too closely, and failed to maintain a proper lookout for other
vehicles, could support an award of punitive damages); Moore v. Harry Norman, Inc., 199
Ga. App. 233, 404 S.E.2d 793 (1991) (evidence of defendants' continued use of lock box key
security system after knowledge of burglaries could support punitive damages award).
429. 261 Ga. 427, 405 S.E.2d 869 (1991).
430. Boswell v. MARTA, 196 Ga. App. 902, 397 S.E.2d 165 (1990).
431. 261 Ga. at 427, 405 S.E.2d at 869.
432. Id. See also Ballard v. MARTA, 200 Ga. App. 880, 410 S.E.2d 49 (1991) (which
followed this holding in Boswell).
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champion of the underdog, characterized the majority's holding as a "blatant example of judicial legislating, 4' 3 3 and urged an application of

MARTA's enabling legislation which makes that entity liable for tortious
injury "as any private corporation. 484 At the other end of the spectrum,
the court in Hospital Authority v. Jones ss concluded that a punitive
damage award does not necessarily have to bear a relationship to the general damages award in a particular case.' 8 In Jones, even though plaintiff's injuries were comparatively relatively minor,137 the potential harm
to others through defendant's conduct was substantial and the punitive
damages in that case, therefore, gave effect to the deterrent aspect of
such damages.""" Finally, in Holman v.Burgess,'4 the court of appeals
considered the question of the scope of pretrial financial discovery 440 in
punitive damages cases. The court first determined that pursuant to section 51-12-5.1, evidence of defendant's financial condition would be discoverable for punitive damages purposes, but expressed concern about
the effects that unlimited discovery could have on an individual's right to
privacy.44 1 After reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, the court determined that evidence of personal financial resources would not be discoverable "absent an evidentiary showing (by affidavit, discovery responses,
or otherwise)
that a factual basis [exists] for [a] punitive damage
2
claim.'

4

In other areas, the court in Read v. Benedict 43 refused to allow a defense of voluntary payment' 4 ' to a third party to thwart plaintiff's tort
claim against defendant. Plaintiff had brought a malpractice claim
against defendant wherein defendant, an attorney, in the process of a real
estate closing, had allowed tax liens to attach to plaintiff's family home.4
The court ruled that plaintiff's payments to the Internal Revenue Service
433. 261 Ga. at 430, 405 S.E.2d at 871 (Smith, P.J., dissenting).

434. 1965 Ga. Laws 2243, 2275.
435.

261 Ga. 613, 409 S.E.2d 501 (1991).

436. Id. at 614, 409 S.E.2d at 502-03.
437.

Plaintiff was only slightly injured in a severe helicopter crash when defendant at-

tempted to transport him to another hospital after having first brought him to one of its
own hospitals, for revenue-producing reasons, instead of using a trauma center more suited
for plaintiff's initial injuries. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 502. See also Hospital Auth. v. Jones, 259
Ga. 759, 386 S.E.2d 120 (1989), for a more detailed accounting of the facts of this case.
438. 261 Ga. at 614-15, 409 S.E.2d at 503.
439. 199 Ga. App. 61, 404 S.E.2d 144 (1991).
440. See generally O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-26 & -34 (Supp. 1992).
441. 199 Ga. App. at 63, 404 S.E.2d at 146-47.

442. Id. at 64, 404 S.E.2d at 147.
443.
444.

200 Ga. App. 4, 406 S.E.2d 488 (1991).
O.C.G.A. § 13-1-13 (1982) provides that "[p]ayments of claims made ... where all
the facts are known ... are deemed voluntary and cannot be recovered .... " Id.
445. 200 Ga. App. at 7, 406 S.E.2d at 491.
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.give rise to a legtitimate defense of vol-

untary payment."

Damages in a wrongful death action may be awarded for the full value
of the decedent's life." 7 As proof of these damages, the court in Consoli-

dated Freightways Corp. v.Futrell'" stated that plaintiffs would be allowed to prove the amount of decedent's veteran's benefits as evidence of
the economic component of the full value of life and would also be allowed to show church activities as evidence of the intangible component
449
of the full value of life.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The year 1951 marked the appearance of two significant American institutions: Mercer Law Review published its first Annual Survey of Georgia Law, and the Polka King, Lawrence Welk,' 50 first broadcast his
Champagne Music on television. 4 1 During the survey period, one of those

landmarks passed from the scene with the death of Maestro Welk on May
17, 1992.452 Although Champagne Music continues only in reruns, 52 the
Georgia Survey bubbles on. That, to serious students of Georgia law, is
truly "wunnerful, wunnerful."

446. Id. at 9, 406 S.E.2d at 492.
447. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-4-1 & -2 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
448. 201 Ga. App. 233, 410 S.E.2d 751 (1991).
449. Id. at 234-35, 410 S.E.2d at 753. See also Callaway v. Rossman, 150 Ga. App. 381,
257 S.E.2d 913 (1979); City of Macon v. Smith, 117 Ga. App. 363, 160 S.E.2d 622 (1968).
450. "He was middle America's hero, pop music's voice for the silent majority." Ernie
Santosuosso, Welk's Rare Vintage: Good Taste, Professionalism, BOSTON GLOBE, May 19,
1992, at L59. "If the British rock invasion represented one side of the Generation Gap in the
'60s, Welk stood way, way on the other side." Hal Boedeker, Welk Was Hallowed Family
Ritual, Like Holiday Dinner, MIAMi HERALD, May 24, 1992, at 18.
451. See Lawrence Welk is Dead: From North Dakota Farm to Fame and Fortune,
PHILA. DAILY NEws, May 19, 1992, at 4.
452. "Last Sunday night, in Santa Monica, Calif., so great a distance from Strasburg,
N.D., they turned off the bubble machine." Lawrence Devine, Remembering a Simple, Genteel Style: Lawrence Welk's Smile Warmed Lots of Hearts, DETROrT FREE PRESS, May 24,
1992, at G1.
453. "As long as there is videotape and people who like polkas and bubbly fox trots, we
may always have Lawrence Welk . . . ." Id.

